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Chapter 1
Introduction
"Ignorant, restless desperados, without conscious or principles, have led a deluded
multitude to follow their standard, under pretense of grievances, which have no existence
but in their imaginations," proclaimed Abigail Adams, referring to the farmers partaking
in Shays' Rebellion, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson (McGinty, 1987, p.11).
Seemingly underestimating the consequences of the rebellion, Jefferson replied
shortly thereafter, "1 hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as
necessary in the political world as storms in the physical... It is a medicine necessary for
the sound health of government" (McGinty, 1987, p.Il).
At the time ofShays' Rebel1ion in 1786 and 1787, however, the United States
government under the Articles of Confederation was far from healthy. The nation was
experiencing severe economic depression, particularly acute for the farmers who were
unable to repay debts owed to shopkeepers and members of the merchant class. When
the Massachusetts General Court moved to increase taxes in 1786, a burden that would
fall most heavily on the fanners, protesters in the western portion of the state grew
increasingly restless and violent. The national congress agreed to address the problem,
calling on the individual states to raise money and recruit troops to suppress the rebellion.
Significantly, the Articles of Confederation did not grant the federal government
the right to levy taxes or raise troops, leaving those duties to the thirteen states with
vastly different interests, I\lotivations, and capabilities. Although Massachusetts was
eventually able to squash the uprising acting alone, Shays' Rebellion raised signi6cant
doubts about tbe ability of the Articles of Confederation to successfully frame the
government of the nation.
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On March 1, 1781, after a long and tedious process of ratification, the Articles of
Confederation became the basis for the national government in the United States of
America. The authors of the document deemed the government to be a "league of
friendship" and declared that its duration would be "perpetual." Given the contentious
relationship that existed among the states at this time and the ultimate failure of the
Articles, the vision of the Framers seems both audacious and naive. In the eighteenth
century there was no major precedent for an agreement among sovereign states that
would warrant being referred to as perpetual, nor would one emerge until the twentieth
century on the European continent.

Following the devastation and instability in Europe in the aftennath of World War
II, six of the continent's nations entered into the European Coal and Steel Commun.ity.
The agreement to enter this organization provided the impetus for the modern day
European Union (EU)I. Although its relatively short history may not be sufficient to
consider the relationship perpetual, the European Union shows promise of continual
integration. Wh.ile these two political systems are fundamentally different in a number of
respects, the basic structure of each organization cail be categorized as a confederacy.
Using the notion of a confederacy as a point of comparison, one can draw valuable
conclusions about what institutions in a confederacy enable a governing body of this type
to remain in existence with some degree of success in fulfilling its goals and duties.

I

For a list of acronyms and abbreviations see Appendix A
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A Brief History of tbe Founding Periods

The Articles of Confederation began to take shape during the Revolutionary War.
Although the colonists feared a strong central government, they were aware of the
practicality of creating some fonn of union to advance their common interests. In 1776, a
committee of thirteen men, led by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, was formed to draft a
governing document for the colonies. The first attempt concentrated substantial authority
in the Congress, yet by the time the Articles of Confederation were submitted for
ratification in 1777, the authors had "left ultimate power in the hands of the states"
(Jensen, 1950, p. 25). Due primarily to concerns over the allocation and control of new
territory, the Articles did not become the official framework of the government until
1781. The only true national branch of this government was the Congress, which had a
set of enumerated powers, but no enforcement mechanism to facilitate these ends. It did
not take much time to realize that the Articles were doomed to failure. Events such as
Shays' Rebellion and the inability to resuscitate the economy after the war higWighted
Congress's weakness. By 1787, the Constitutional Convention was underway, and, upon
rati fication of the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation were rendered null and
void.
Unlike the government created by the Articles, the European Union has evolved
slowly over the last half a century, cautiously building on each previous success. At the
heart of this incremental process is the 1950 Schuman Doctrine, in which French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman thared his idea of a united Europe. However, he cautioned,
"
"Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single general plan. It will be built

through concrete achievements which at first create a de facto solidarity" (Nugent, 1994,
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p.39). The motivation for a united Europe was multifaceted. Political figures hoped for a
reconciliation of the deep hostilities between France and Germany, a future in which
strong nationalism would not dominate the political landscape, and a Western Europe

free from communism. Economic integration was also sought to rebuild the war-torn
economies.

In 1951, six nations signed the Treaty of Paris, fonning the European Coal and
Steel Community, and two 1957 Treaties of Rome brought into force the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The adoption of
these three

documen~s constitutes

the foundation of the European Community. Since the

1950s, the EU has expanded to include fifteen countries, with the potential of integrating
Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future. Thee other treaties, those signed in Maastricht
(1992) and Nice (2000, not yet ratified by all member states), as well as the Single
European Act (1986), have been critical in shaping its current form. The institutional and
political developments have been substantial, including the adoption of a si.ngle currency
and the move toward a common foreign and defense policy. The future promises further
unification, although the extent to which the constituent states will integrate remains
uncertain.
These two examples raise a fundamental question: what institutions in a
confederacy are adequate for it to execute its aims? Because political systems tend to be
dynamic, changing over time according to the needs and environment of the polity, one
must especially take into at-count the process by which the founding documents can be

"
amended to facilitate a change in both the broad goals and specific objectives. The
American government under the Articles of Confederation and the European Union will
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serve as case studies to illustrate what institutions are most appropriate to a confederacy.
The analysis will include an examination of the goals ofbolh organizations; their primary
governing institutions and the procedures used in them; and the mechanisms by which
these governing bodies are amended. The Articles and the EU are appropriate case
studies because they are vastly different in their institutional structure, but share the same
foundation as a confederacy. The lessons learned may be generalized to confederal
governments formed in the future.

Theoretical Framework
A theoretical framework must be established to better understand the interaction
between the institutions and the goals or demands of a polity. In his book, A Framework

for Political Analysis, as well as his article, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political
Systems," David Easton outlines an appropriate and relevant theory. He states, "The
behavior of every political system is to some degree imposed upon it by the kind of
system it is, that is, by its own structure and internal needs" (Easton, 1957, p.386). One
must keep in mind, however, that this principle does not imply that all confederacies will
behave similarly because it is unlikely that the structures and internal needs of any two
systems will be identical. However, because confederacies do share common features
identifying them as a given type of government, one can assume that there will be some
degree of universal conduct.

.

Easton addresses two additional and relevant points. The first concerns what
~

sustains a political system, and the second pertains to the inputs into a political system.
Easton hypothesizes ''that if a structured system is to maintain itself, it must provide
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mechanisms whereby its members are integrated or induced to cooperate in some
minimal degree so that they can make authoritative decisions" because "in every system
support stems in part from fear of sanctions or compulsion" (Easton, 1957, p.387, 396).
Applying this reasoning to a confederacy leads to the conclusion that no matter how
loosely organized the governing authority is, it must provide some fonn of coercive
incentive to create a basic level of cooperation ensuring the continuance of the political
system.
Finally, Easton discusses the function and impact of demands in a governing
body. Inputs are central to the creation of a political system. "The reason why a political
system emerges in a society at all-that is, why men engage in political activity-is that
,demands are being made by persons or groups in the society that cannot all be fully
satisfied" wi thout the formation of a political system (Easton, 1957, p.387).
A confederacy may be created when individual nations or states determine that it

is in their best interest is to unite on some level. [n other words, when the existing
political institutions are inadequate to meet specified demands of a group of separate
states, they will look to design a governing body that is sufficient to fulfill the needs of
the states. When the original and subsequent goals and demands "require some special
organized effort on the part of society to settle them authoritatively... they have become
inputs of the po titical system.... In every ongoing system, demands may emerge for
alterations in the political relationships of the members themselves, as the result of
dissatisfaction stemming £tom these relationships" (Easton, 1957, p.3 87, 388).
~

Inputs into a confederacy depend on the scope of the policy areas covered by the
government. If the political system cannot respond to a given problem authoritatively,
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the input will either be ineffectively dealt with by the confederacy or wiU be diverted to
the state level.

Ai;

Easton mentions, if there is discontent among the members, the

political system will likely be altered. This is especialty true with respect to a
confederacy in which states have not relinquished their sovereignty and are therefore
more likely to respond to any threat to their interests. However, change may also work in
the other direction, should the members agree to build on the previous successes of the
confederacy and integrate further. Easton's analysis of political systems provides a
useful framework through which one can better understand the theory behind the
functions of a confederacy. His work will be a helpful foundation in examining the
institutions and goals of the Articles and the EU.

The Articles of Confederation and the European Union as Confederacies
With the theoretical framework in mind, the next step is to establish that both the
American government und,er the Articles and the European Union are confederacies. At
the most mundane level, a confederacy is "an agreement between two or more states or
nations by which they unite for their mutual protection and good. This term is applied to
such agreements between two independent nations, but it is also used to signify the union
ofdifferent states of the same nation" (Lectlaw, 2001). The implication of this definition
is that individual citizens do not ratify confederations because they are simply an
agreement reached between two states. Confederations are not grounded in popular
sovereignty. It is the respo~sibility of the state or nation to enter into and ratify the

....

agreement, without the specific consent of the governed. Furthermore, in a
confederation, "policy competence in key areas affecting sovereignty remains largely in
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the hands of the component member-states" (Rosamond, 2000, p.26). This implies that
sovereignty, too, remains in the hand of the members if they are to retain jurisdiction over
sovereign matters. Finally, confederations
are primarily communities of polities, which place greater emphasis on the
liberties of the constituent polities. It is the task of the constituent polities
to protect individual liberty, more or less as each defines it, although the
constituent polities of confederations of republics must conform to at least
minimum standards of individual liberty in order to preserve the
republican character of the whole (Elazar, 1982, p.3).
The Articles of Confederation clearly fall within the scope of this definition. The
document was an agreement among thirteen states, ratified by the states themselves. That
the Articles were ratified in the state legislatures and not in state conventions specifically
called for that purpose, and that the state legislatures paid the salaries of the delegates to
Congress upholds this assertion.
The language of the Articles is also an indication that it is a confederation. The
framers refer to the government as a "perpetual union between states," and in Article II,
the states finnly proclaim, "each state retains its sovereignty," except where power has
been "expressly" delegated to Congress; powers delegated to Congress were narrowly
construed. There is no notion that the Articles were authored by "we the people," as
there is in the Constitution. Rather, the attention is clearly focused on the states. "The
Articles of Confederation emphasized so heavily its status as a compact between the
states tbat the framers felt a need to provide language reminding the readers that they
were indeed engaged in a common cause," thus incorporating phrases such as a "finn
league of friendship" (Lutz, 1990, p.65).
Finally, states largely retained prerogatives pertaining to individual liberties. The
text of the Articles provides for full faith and credit and privileges and immunities,

-----

--_._
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creating a limited degree of unifonnity in laws among the states; but with a few
exceptions safeguarding property, the Articles do not mention individual liberty.
Because the document works on a system of enumerated powers with those remaining
residing in the states, the power to define and protect individual liberty must, by
consequence, be left to the states. Clearly, the Articles of Confederation fall within the
scope of a confederation as defined above.
Classifying the European Vnioo is a more difficult task. No general consensus
exists on exactly what type ofpolilical system it is, but a strong case can be made that the
EU is a confederation. As Paul Hirst states, 'The EU is inescapably more con federal
than it is federal" (Bellamy, 1995, p.51). First, the European Union has not yet reached
the stage of becoming a sovereign state. "It lacks the essential qualities which, despite
considerable structural changes in statehood in the last .fifty years, still define the
character of political rule [of a state]: exclusive jurisdiction over a closed territory and a
circumscribed group of people, and the possession of undivided supreme power" (preuss,
1999, p.419). Furtheonore, treaties and amendments are not universally ratified through
popular sovereignty within the European Community. Although a few nations have
utilized citizen referenda prior to ratification by the national legislatures, the vast
majority of nations simply approve the treaties without consulting their citizens.
Therefore, the European Union still constitutes an agreement among several states.
With respect to policy competences, foreign policy still largely remains a state
prerogative, which clearly tmplies that the states remain in control of areas especially

.....
relevant to their national interest. There is no European military, leaving defensive and
offensive force capabilities in the hands of the constituent states. Moreover, on several
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major foreign policy issues, the most powerful states in the EO cannot reach a consensus
on how to act. Britain often sides with the United States on matters relating to conflict in
the Middle East, while France gravitates away from the United States. For example,
France has withdrawn its military from aerial patrols over Iraq, while Britain remains an
active and important ally to the United States. The absence of a military and the inability
to agree on a single foreign policy are indicative of the notion that the EU still remains a
confederacy.
Moreover, EU still has no doctrine as powerful as the United States Bill of Rights,
in which specific individual liberties are enumerated. There is a charter of rights based

on the concept of European citizenship, yet when the European Court of Justice makes
human rights decisions, it still "draw[s] inspiration from constitutional traditions common
to the member states" (Dehousse, 1996, p.64). As long as national constitutions are the
driving force behind the protection of human rights, the EU is secondary to the nations in
the protection of indi vidual liberties, lending further support to the notion that the EU is a
confederacy.
The European Union may eventually evolve beyond a confederation, into a true
federation. Several factors are indicative of eventual progress in this direction, yet in the
near future the transition is highly unlikely. The European Monetary Union (EMU) has
advanced significantly with the introduction of the euro. At this point, however, not all
member states of the EU are members of the EMU. Three nations have not joined
(Denmark, Sweden, and Btitain). and Greece became a member in January 2001 after it
""'

met specified economic standards. Until the euro and membership in the EMU become
mandatory for all members of the ED, the European Union is not a truly federal body.

-~_.

.

_.-
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Moreover, the European Court of Justice has created a sovereignty clause, subjugating
national law to Comrnunjty law, and a direct effect principle, under which Community
law applies directly to national citizens and not just to each country as a unit.
Furthennore, the EU is establishing a foundation on which to build a common foreign
and security policy. In December 200 I, the leaders of the fifteen member states agreed to
hold a constitutional convention. The convention opened on February 28,2002,
composed of IDS representatives from 28 European nations. Led by fonner French
president Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the current and future member states are early in the
process of negotiation. Although the notion of a constitutional convention implies a
move toward a federation, the reality is vastly different. While delegates to the
convention will no doubt discuss the possibility of drafting a constitution that would
fundamentally alter the balance of power in the EU, the likelihood is that such a dramatic
change will not be authorized by the constituent states. The member nations all come to
the table with differing opinions; and because any new document must be approved
unanimously, the outcome will be a comprorruse. For example, while Germany is
"pushing for" a more federalist political system, both "President Jacques Ch..irac of
France and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain argue vehemently that the union must
remain an organization of 'states united,' not a 'united states'" (Daley, 2001, p.1). The
delegates of the convention are not slated to release their report until 2003. Clearly,
although the evolutionary process of the European Union is by no means complete, the
government is currently a tonfederacy.
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Outline
The remainder of the thesis will focus on tbe goals and institutions of the Articles
of Confederation and the European Union, eventually arriving at a conclusion regarding
what enables a confederacy to succeed. Chapter two will provide a detailed history of the
Articles of Confederation and the European Union, followed by an explanation of the
original goals of these confederacies and of how tbe obj ectives evolved over rime. The
third chapter will analyze and compare the institutions of the political systems, including
how they are amended. Finally, the previous discussion will be synthesized into an
examination of what institutions have proven to be adequate to fulfill the aims of the
Articles and EU, and what general conclusions may be drawn from the case studies.
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Chapter 2
The History of the Articles of Confederation and the European Union
The histories of the Articles of Confederation and European Union provide an
important context in which to understand the evolution of the goals and institutions of
each government. Both were created during or in the aftermath of major wars, and each
institution was deeply affected by the conflict that preceded it. However, the processes
by which the American Confederacy and ED were fonned differ dramatically. The
Articles of Confederation was a single and short-lived governing document, while the
European Union cODtinues to evolve over time through a series of treaties. Various
conflicts plagued the ratification of both governing structures, and the paths to unification
were far from simple. This chapter will provide insight into the evolution of the Articles
and the ED in order to lay the groundwork for further analysis.

The History ofthe Articles of Confederation
The decade of the 1770s was one of the most decisive in the history of the United
States. America united to create a new nation in the Revolutionary War and then
struggled to preserve that cohesiveness in the post-war period. Although there was no
explicit plan at the outset of the war, many political leaders recognized the need to create
some Conn of centralized government to facilitate the war effort and to provide at least
minimal, but enduring, cooperation among the states. The thirteen colonies possessively
guarded their sovereignty, 'and their actions exacerbated the vast diITerences in their
distinct individual cultures and interests. Without Britain to serve as a central aut'fiority,
many [eared that the political situation would disintegrate to the point of civil war. At the
First Continental Congress, Pennsylvanian Joseph Galloway maintained "that if the
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colonies denied the authority of Parliament they would be 'in a perfect state of nature' in
their relations with one another" (Jensen, 1950, p.23).
Not only were the colonists divided by state loyalties, but they were also
confronting a split between the newly formed radicals and conservatives. Radicals
tended to be those members of society working as tradesmen, fanners, and laborers,
while conservatives were generally the wealthy businessmen and landowners,
constituting a social, political, and economic elite. Tension between the two factions was
fierce, as radicals sought a break from British rule, while conservatives hoped to remain
under some degree of governance by Britain. "The radicals took their stand for
independence... as a means of overthrowing the colonial aristocracy ... The
conservatives, however, fearing the rise of the masses ifcomplete independence were
achieved, clung to the hope that there could be reconciliation with Great Britain"
(Nichols, 1964, p. 308). As it became increasingly clear that a complete break from
England was inevitable, the conservatives sought a strong centralized government to
ensure the continuation of their control. It was in this context that the task of formulating
a plan of government was undertaken.
At the outset of the Revolutionary War, the delegates to the Continental Congress
were understandably more focused on issues of independence and defense than they were
on fanning a lasting union. Virginia delegate Richard Henry Lee noted that due to "the
immensity of business created by the war, the Confederation goes on but slowly"
(Greene, 1982, p. 16). Furthermore, there was concern among the delegates that state
'

interests would prove too divisive to form a central government. In 1775, John Adams
mused that "it would be a Miracle, if Such hetero geneous Ingredients did not at first
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produce violent Fermentations" (Greene, 1982, p. 16). However, it was the early
successes that the Continental Congress experienced in fighting the war against Great
Britain that served as the impetus [or one of the first major plans to be submitted for
consideration.
On June 11, 1776, Congress passed a resolution declaring that "a committee be
appointed to prepare and digest the form of a Confederation to be entered into between
these colonies" (Nichols, 1964, p. 314). The following day, John Dickinson of
Pennsylvania was selected to chair the committee, consisting of one delegate from each
colony. Three members of the committee, including Dickinson, bad been staunchly
opposed to independence. Three were conservatives, but favored independence. Four
men were loosely associated with the conservative movement, two were not partial to
either position, and two delegates were radicals (Nichols, 1964). Despite the conflicting
political perspectives, the fourteen men presented a draft of the Articles of Confederation
to the Congress exactly one month after the committee was initially selected.
Dickinson's conservative influeoce was evident, as the draft favored a strong central
government.
The Dickinson Plan reserved few powers to the states and embedded substantial
authority in the federal government. States retained the power to maintain a militia and
appoint officers to serve for the common defense of the union, as well as the power to
levy impost duties. Article Three, however, bluntly Jj.mited the exercise of these powers
to cases in which they did not conflict with the Articles of Confederation. The draft
'

pronounced that each state was granted "as much of its present Laws, Rights and
Customs, as it may think fit, and reserves to itself the sole and exclusive Regulation and
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Government of its internal police, in all matters that shall not interfere into the Articles of
Confederation." The only substantial power denied to Congress was that of taxation
(Hoffert, 1992, p. 84). Dickinson's proposal for representation stipulated that the states
would appoint delegates to the national Congress, although it did not specify how many
delegates per person, and declared that each state would have one vote in the Congress.
The Dickinson Plan engendered considerable controversy among the
Congressional delegates, and it was not until November 15, 1777, that a final draft of the
Articles of Confederation was reached. There were four primary areas that threatened to
undo the union: ''the equal representation of all states in Congress, the basis for the
apportionment of common expenses, tbe grant of powers to the central government over
western lands, and the distribution of power between the states and Congress to defme
the precise location of sovereignty" (Hoffert, 1995, p. 85).
With respect to the issue of representation in Congress, three different schools of
thought emerged. The first was created by the large states advocating representation
based on population in order to skew the weight of votes on the national level in their
favor. The second and third both sought a one vote per state principle, although for
different reasons. Those hoping to create a weak central government based on tbe union
of states, and not people, favored one vote per state because "the very nature of the
central government would be different ifunits of population rather than state government
were represented" (Jensen, 1950, p.24). Finally, tbe small states favored the one vole per
state theory to ensure tbat they did not become underrepresented and dominated in

'"
Congress. The latter two groups combined forces, resulting in the adoption of equal
representation for each state.
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A second stumbling block was created over the issue of how much each state
should contribute to the national treasury. Dickinson proposed a plan based on the land
value within tbe respective states, and this fonnula was eventually incorporated in the
Articles. However, the New England states protested. the adoption of this principle
because they believed their land to be more valuable than that of the rest of the nation.
As a result, they hoped to implement a plan under which states would contribute to tbe
national treasury based on state population, excluding Indians. The New England states,
however, were outnumbered, and public expenses were to be allocated according to land
value.
Perhaps the most contentious issue arose over western lands. In [act, the
divergent opinions threatened and greatly delayed tbe ratification of the Articles. The
Dickinson Plan included a provision to grant Congress the control over western lands that
was subsequently dropped. Understandably, states had vested interests in the control of
land. Many states had borders that were already set, including most of New England.
Others, notably Virginia, possessed substantial land claims extending far into the west.
Landed states were reluctant to simply cede their territory to the national government,
fearing the loss of potentially valuable resources. Eventually, the landed states were
victorious, although the issue was far from over, as will become clear in the discussion on
the ratification of the Articles.
Finally, states were concerned about the retention of sovereignty. Many feared
that the Dickinson draft

w~

too progressive in terms of empowering the federal
"'

government and limiting the states. Thomas Burke of North Carolina was the most
outspoken advocate of language in the Articles reaffirming state power. He was
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especially fearful of language in the third article, which he claimed "expressed only a
reservation of the power of regulating the internal police, and consequently resigned
every other power" (Jensen, 1950, p. 25). Burke's argument was so persuasive, and
individual state interests were felt so strongly, that the Articles were amended with a
clause proclaiming, "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and
every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled" (Article II).
On November 17, 1777, a draft of the Articles of Confederation was sent to each
state, accompanied by an explanatory letter, setting March 10, 1778, as the date for
ratification. The letter explained the difficulties of the process and attempted to j uslify
the new government. ''To form a permanent union," it read, "accommodated to the
opinion and wishes of the delegates of so many states differing in habits, produce,
commerce, and intemal policies, was found to be a work which nothing but time and
reflection., conspiring with a disposition to conciliate, could mature and accomplish."
Moreover, the plan was "the best which could be adapted to the circumstances of all, and
as that alone which affords any tolerable prospect of general ratification" (Nichols, 1964,
p.3J2).
Only Virginia ratified the Articles by the date set forth in the letter, and several of
the other states offered amendments to the draft. All were defeated, however, and after
contentious battles in many states, by January 1779, Maryland remained. the only state
not to have approved the Articles. Again, the sticking point was the control over western
"'

lands. Maryland, a landless state, issued an ultimatum declaring that it would not ratify
the Articles unless Congress was granted power over western lands. The state was
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primarily concerned with Virginia's protective actions regarding its vast land
possessions. Even when Virginia made minor concessions, including offering portions of
its land as a payment to Revolutionary War soldiers, Maryland still would not relent.
Finally, New York took the lead and relinquished its western lands. Virginia soon
followed suit, supported by "Jefferson, Lee, and other Virginians [who felt] that such and
extensive area as Virginia claimed was inconsistent with the principles of democracy and
local control which they advocated and that Virginia should limit itself' (Nichols, 1964,
p.339). Thus, on March 1, 1781, the Articles of Confederation were signed into action.
Articles I through ill offer important rhetorical language in understanding the
document. Terms such as "perpetual union," "United States of America," and "firm
league of friendship" all give a sense of unification, yet with some reserve. A league
would imply something less than a single nation, and the entire second article is included
simply to reaffirm the sovereignty of the states. Its prominent position in the document,
following only the naming of the union, is indicative of the importance that states placed
upon maintaining their individual interests and liberties. Moreover, the purpose of the
union seems primarily concerned with defense, as illustrated by Article III: 'The said
states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their
common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general wei fare,
binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon
them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence
whatever." The bonds onmity are only asserted under conditions of attack, not in daily
life.
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Article IV establishes privileges and immunities among the citizens of the states,
freedom of movement among states, full faith and credit, and extradition rights. Article
V lays out the fundamental rules governing Congress. State legislatures were glven
responsibility for determining the manner in which their delegates were elected to
Congress. States could be represented by anywhere from two to seven individuals, but
each state had only one vote. Tenn limits were set, limiting delegates to no more than
three years of service in a six year period, and delegates were restricted from
simultaneously holding another paid position in the United States government. Freedom
of debate in Congress was also established. The sixth article enumerated specific
restrictions, focusing primarily on the states. The limitations included prohibitions from
sending ambassadors, forging treaties with either another state or another nation, laying
imposts that interfere with United States treaties, maintaining peacetime military forces,
or engaging in war. Article VII granted state legislatures the authority to appoint officers
of or under the rank of colonel upon the calling to duty of land forces, and Article VllI
provided for a common treasury supported by ta'(es levied by the state governments
based on the land value of the state.
The powers of Congress were explicitly enumerated in Article IX, numbering
nearly twenty. Many related 10 foreign policy and defense, while others focused on
monetary authority and other components of the national infrastructure (post offices,
weights and measures, etc.). Although many of the minor powers were to be decided by
majority votes in

Congres~,

major decisions, including the powers to declare war, enter
~

treaties, or borrow money, required the approval of nine states. Moreover, Article X
provided for a Committee of the States, composed of delegates from at least nine states,
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to carry out administrative tasks and less consequential decision-making. Article Xl
provided for the automatic entry of Canada into the confederacy, while requiring nine
states to agree to the admittance of any other colony, and Article XlI enabled Congress to
assume the burden of the Revolutionary War debts.
Finally, Article xm reafflrmed that the union was to be perpetual, and that states
should submit to the decisions of the national Congress. Furthermore, it established a
process of amendment requiring unanimity among all of the states in order to change the
document. This article would eventually help pave the way to the demise of the
Confederation. The authors of the document were naive in their prediction of a perpetual
union, especially because the procedure for amendment was entirely impractical. In very
few instances would all states agree to change the Articles, preventing any rational
solution to institutional problems contained within the document, of which there were
many. For example, Article XIII itself required that all states submit to the national
Congress; yet there was no workable enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.
Within this structural framework the Articles of Confederation eventually doomed itself
to failure, to which the paper shall tum in chapters three and four after a discussion of the
history of the European Union.

The History ofthe European Union
Jean Monnet, an integral figure in the initial steps toward unification of Europe,
astutely observed the chaJienging world around him at the culmination of World War n.
'

In a May 1950 memorandum to Robert Schuman, Monnet stated:

Whichever way yol,l turn in the situation in the world today, you meet only
deadlock, whether it is the growing acceptance of the inevitability ofa
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war, the Gennan problem, the continuation of French recovery, the
organization of Europe, even the place of France in Europe and in the
world.
To get out of such a situation there is only one way: concrete and resolute
action, bearing on a limited but decisive point, changing it fundamentally
and systematically changing the very tenns of the whole set of problems
(Salmon, 1997, pAl).
The decisive action of which Monnet spoke was the European Coal and Steel Communjty
(ECSC), first articulated in the Schuman Plan, authored by French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman. Both Monnet and Schuman envisioned the ECSC as merely a
preliminary step to further European integration. Clearly di fferent from the creation of
the Uruted States govemment in 1781 by a single document, the European Uruon today
continues to evolve from this basic starting point.
Signed on April 18, 1951, the Treaty of Paris facilitated the creation of a common
pool of coal and steel resources among the six participating countries. Four institutions
were created to govern the community: the High Authority, the Council of Ministers, the
Common Assembly, and the Court ofJustice. Monnet served as the rust president of the
High Authority, which acted as a supranational body regulating the common pool of coal

and steel resources. The Council of Miillsters, composed of ministers from each national
government, was a mechan.ism through wruch states could check the power of the High
Authority and represent their individual interests. In theory, the Common Assembly was
supposed to add a democratic element to the ECSC; yet in practice, it lacked any
substantial powers. Finally, the Court of Justice was created to mediate disputes between
states. The ECSC provided a solid foundation upon willch to con.tinue building t.1le
integration process.
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Prior to the next major step toward unification, there was a failed attempt at
creating a common defense policy among the nations. The failure of the common
defense plan suggested to the member states that they were not yet ready to merge
resources and policies in areas beyond the economic realm. However, in 1955, the
foreign ministers of each country adopted the Messina Resolution, affirming their
commitment to unification and laying out a broad outline of how to proceed in the
desired direction. The preamble of the resolution stated:
The Governments ... believe the moment has come to go a step further
towards the construction of Europe. In their opinion this step should first
of all be taken in the economic field.
They consider that the further progress must be towards the setting of a
United Europe by the development of common institutions, the gradual
merging of national economies, the creation of a common market, and the
gradual harmonization of their social policies.
Such a policy appears to them to be indispensable if Europe's position in
the world is to be maintained, her influence restored, and the standard of
living of her population progressively raised (Salmon, 1997, p.59).
Out of the Messina Resolution grew the Treaties of Rome, which came into effect
on January 1, 1958. One treaty established the European Economic Community while
the other created Euratom, an organization sharing responsibility for atomic energy issues
including research and the dissemination of information to the public. The EEC treaty
was by far the more significant of the two. Influenced by the Schuman Plan and the
Messina Resolution, the focus was nearly exclusively economic.
The broad goal was to establish a common market among the six participating
nations. Specific policy objectives were vague, "given the uncertainties,

djsagre~ents

and compromises which fonned the background to the signing of the Treaty" (Nugent,
1994, p.46). There was some notion of further unification; however, particular plans
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were clearly not addressed. The preamble of the treaty simply set out "to lay the
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (Treaty establishing
the European Community).
What the Treaty of Rome did accomplish was the structuring of the Community's
institutions. Much like the ECSC, four principal institutions were established. The
Commission would assume tbe role of the High Authority, serving as the primary policy
initiator. The Council of Ministers would be composed of ministers from the individual
nations and would act as the key decision-making body. The Assembly eventually
became democratically elected by universal suffrage in 1979, and it remained relatively
powerless until later treaties increased its role in the policy-making process. The
Assembly is currently known as the European Parliament (EP). Finally, the Court of
Justice was retained to interpret and apply Community law. From this point until the
Treaty on European Union in 1993, the union was known as the European Community
(EC).
For the next thirty years, the process of unification ebbed and flowed. Perhaps the
most critical development during this time was the gradual addition of new countries to
the Community. By 1995, the EU had grown to the current size of fifteen members.
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were the six
founding members. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined,
followed by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Finland, and
Sweden in 1995. For mosrnations the process of accession involved meeting the
'

economic and political standards of the Community, various rounds of negotiations, and a
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final acceptance. A few nations, including Denmark and Ireland, required a citizen
referendum approving membership.
The United Kingdom, however, proved to be the exception to a smooth transition
into the Community. Britain tended to be more nationalist than most of the other
European nations. The island nation views itself as politically, culturally, and
geographically distinct from mainland Europe. As a result, it was disinclined to join the
early attempts at unification. However, a few years after the formation of the European
Community, Britain changed course. Unfortunately, French President Charles de Gaulle
had different intentions. For various reasons, including worries that the United Kingdom
would usurp French power in the Community, fears that the UK would unbalance the
emerging friendship between France and Germany that had been so long in the making,
and skepticism of the tight relationship between Britain and the United States, de Gualle
strongly opposed British accession (Nugent, 1994, p.29). It took the resignation of de
Gaulle, and the new French presidency of Georges Pompidou, for the United Kingdom to
become a member of the European Community.
One other development to note in the period prior to the Single European Act and
the Treaty on European Union is that of the Luxembourg Compromise. Once again,
French President and strong nationalist Charles de Gaulle was responsible for disrupting
the proceedings of the European Community. Although the immediate issue centered
around a proposal to fmalize plans for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the
Luxembourg Compromise'truly grew out of France's hesitation to give up increasing
~

amounts of its sovereignty. When negotiations on the CAP reached a deadlock, France
withdrew its delegation from most decision-making processes in the Community. It did,
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however, continue to implement EC law within its national borders. For six months,
France was absent from the Council of Ministers and the Commission, and the period
came to be known as the time of the Empty Chair Crisis. Final ly, France reentered its
full role as a result of the Luxembourg Compromise, articulated in 1966.
The key provision was Part [I, which Slated, "the French delegation considers that
where very important interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until
unanimous agreement is reached" (Salmon, 1997, p.94). For all practical purposes, this
single phrase gave all member states a veto power over any policy issue that significantly
affected their national interest. Because national interest could be so loosely interpreted,
the veto power covered. virtually any policy area. In practice, however, the national veto
was rarely used because "most decisions, even on routine issues, came to be made by
letting deliberations and negotiations run until an agreement finally emerged. As a result
there was rarely a need for the veto to be formally invoked, and it was so only very
occasionally-no more than a dozen times between 1966 and 1985" (Nugent, 1994,
p.145). The 1986 Single European Act served as the demise for the Luxembourg
Compromise by expanding the circwnstances in which majority voting could be applied.
The next major treaty amending the EC was the Single European Act (SEA). The
main thrust of the SEA was a firm commitment to a single internal market by 1992.
However, another important development was the codification of European Political
Cooperation (EPC), the term for cooperation in the area of foreign policy. The treaty
stated,
The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on
questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the
development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are
ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and
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economic aspects of security," and went on to create a Secretariat to
"assist the Presidency in preparing and implementing the activities of
European Political Cooperation (Salmon, 1997, p. 206).
Finally, the policy areas governed by the EU were expanded into fields including the
environment and the development and research of new technology.
Despite the apparent progress made by the SEA, many member states felt that the
treaty did not go far enough toward

urn fication.

"In consequence, even before the SEA

was ratified, the view was being expressed in many influential quarters that further
integration would soon be necessary" (Nugent, 1994, p. 57). Thus, in 1991, after several
years of negotiations and preliminary reports, a series of intergovernmental conferences
was conducted, culminating in the December 1991 presentation of their reports at the
Council of Ministers meeting in Maastricht. Out of these reports grew the Treaty on
European Unjon (TEU), signed in February 1992, and taking effect November 1, 1993.
The TEU transformed the European Community into the European Villon. The
name change from "community" to "union" was symbolic of the increasing ties among
the member states. Like the preceding treaties, the TEU was viewed as yet another step
forward in the continual process of integration. The document contains approximately
250 pages, clearly differing from the concise Articles of Confederation. Article 1 states,
'The Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as
possible to the citizen" (Treaty on European Union). As a result of the TEU, the
foundation of the EU was substantially altered and set upon three basic pillars: the
European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and
Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (iliA). The European
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Communities are composed of the ECSC, Euratom. and the EEC, renamed the European
Community (EC).
The Treaty of Rome was amended by the TEU. altering several characteristics of
the newly named EC. First. a European Union citizenship was created, granting each
citizen residing within the EU liberties including the right to reside in any of the fifteen
states. and the right to vote and participate in elections in any state. Second, tbe principle
of subsidiarity was enacted, defining the policy jurisdiction of the European
Communities:
The Community shaH act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it
by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. only if
an in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be belier achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty. (Treaty of Rome, as amended by the
TEU).
While the subsidiarity principle may be regarded as vague, in practice it "is taken to mean
that policies should be decided at national, and perhaps even regional or local levels,
whenever possible" (Nugent, 1994, p.69).
With respect to the CFSP and JHA piJlars, the member states demonstrated a clear
willingness and desire to collaborate in efforts far beyond economic affairs. Although the
CFSP was by no means a unification of national defense resources, it did establish broad
outlines for coordinating

an internal and external foreign policy strategy.

The TEU reads,
""

"The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" (Treaty on European Union).
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The TEU was generally vague in further identifying goals and objectives, and left the
task of further definition to the European Council. Finally, the JHA pillar is the
foundation for cooperation in criminal justice with the hope of providing "citizens with a
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing
common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia" (Treaty on
European Union). The CFSP and JHA pillars, as well as the consolidation of the
European Communities, mark a dramatic shift from the creation of the ECSC as the
initial step towards unification. The EU gradually built on its successes and overcame
the obstacles inevitable in the creation of a supranational authority. What, exactly,
facilitated this dramatic transition as the EU worked toward its goal of unification is one
of the subjects of the remainder of this study.
Ratification of the TEU was anything but simple, and although the nations had
hoped that it would take effect on January 1, 1993, they experienced a ten-month delay in
the process. Four cOWltries contributed to the setback: Denmark, France, Britain, and
Germany. In Denmark, the government held a popular referendum to approve the treaty.
Bya margin of 50.7% to 49.3%, the TEU was defeated. Denmark was forced to undergo
a major public relations campaign, downplaying the extent of integration that would be
brought by the TED, in order to gain the support of those opposed to ratification. In a
second referendum held in May 1993, the treaty was narrowly approved. France, too,
held a popular referendum. Although the citizens approved the TEU on the first attempt,
'

the election was fiercely contested, and the final vote was only 51.05% in favor of the
treaty. In Britain, it was the Parliament that delayed the ratification process. In keeping
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with tradition, the UK was once again reluctant to move closer to integration. General
skepticism prevailed, and it took until July 1993 to approve the treaty. Finally, Germany
experienced constitutional difficulties. While the TEU cleared the legislative branch, the
nation's high court had to review the treaty to ensure that it did not conflict with the
German constitution. In October 1993, the court granted its approval, albeit with
conditions on any possible future changes in the TEV (Nugent, 1994).
Over the next decade the European Union is expected to expand to include as
many as 27 member states. The current structure of the Union's institutions is not
appropriate to govern such an expansive territory. For example, the Court of Justice, akin
in its tasks to the United States Supreme Court, currently has one member per state. For
this body to grow to 27 members, with the expectation that each one sit in the plenary
court sessions, would mean that the consensus required for the ECJ to reach a decision
would be nearly impossible to formulate. The European Parliament, with only 15
member states, already has over 600 Members of Parliament (MPs). One can only
imagine the difficulty in trying to participate in the legislative process with a parliament
of upwards of 1,000 members.
At the beginning of2001, an intergovernmental conference proposed the Treaty
of Nice, to be ratified over the next 18 months. Once it enters into action, the new treaty
will amend many structural aspects of the EU institutions in order to make it more
capable of handling the expanding member base. The Court of Justice, for example, will
continue to be composed Of one member per state, but will only meet in chambers of
"

eleven or fewer judges. The EP will be capped at 732 members, and a reallocation of the
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MPs will take place to ensure that the new member states have adequate representation
(Summary of the Treaty of Nice, 2001).
The challenges facing the European Union are numerous, especially as it
approaches a decade in which its membership is anticipated nearly to double. The
growing pains may be severe. Moreover, the structure of the union may change, subject
to the outcome of the March 2002 constitutional convention, although the results are not
due until 2003. It is with this in mind that this study will tum to an evaluation of the
adequacy of the institutions to facilitate the achievement of the EU's goals, as compared
to the goals and institutions of the Articles of Confederation.
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Chapter 3
The Goals of the Articles of Confederation and the European
Union

The Goals ofthe Articles of Confederation
The notion of formulating a union among several distinct colonies was forged
during a time of war. At stake in the struggle were the lofty aspirations of selfgovernment and independence. The demands of war and the basic needs of the young
nation shaped the original goals of the framers of the Articles of Confederation, as
illustrated in Section ill of the document
The said states hereby severally enter into a finn league of friendship with
each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and
their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other,
against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever
(Articles of Confederation).
There is clearly strong language in the text, evident in such phrases as "firm league,"
''binding themselves to assist each other," and the commitment to unite against "all force"
used against "them, or any of them."
However, despite the powerful rhetoric, the commitment to unity under the
specified objectives is weakened once one exa.mines the section in the context of the
Articles as a whole. Inunediately preceding this section is Section II proclairrung, "Each
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled" (Articles of Confederation). The consideration of state sovereignty
'

is valued considerably more than unity, given that the independence of the slales is boldly
affirmed even before the general premise of the union is outlined in the following section.
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The radicals, who deeply feared a strong central government as a result of British
.domination, ultimately dominated the process of drafting the Articles. The emphasis was
on the slales as individual communities. Weakening the national government in relation
to the state governments was integral in preserving the autonomy and sovereignty of the
states.
Moreover,
The democratic theory of the time was antagonistic to any government
with pretensions toward widespread dominion. Theorists believed that
democratic government was impossible except within very limited areas.
Virginia democrats, for example, were willing to surrender her Western
land claims because they believed that their state was too large for
democratic government (Jensen, 1966, p.161).
Influential political theorists at the time, especially Montesquieu, argued that democracy
was only feasible in a small geographic area. The authors of the Articles recognized the
vast territory that would be governed by the document.., and in response, concentrated the
power of democratic government within the states, as opposed to the national
government. The priority of sovereignty over the goals of unification will be relevant in
the upcoming discussion on the evolving intents of the Confederation.
The Eastonian framework is particularly relevant in understanding the nature of
objectives in a political system. In the broadest sense, Easton's inputs can be likened to
the goals driving the creation of a governing body. Inputs include "any event external to
the system ... that alters, modifies, or affects the system in any way" and may be divided
into "demands and support" (Easton, 1965, p. 113, 114). If, in the case of the Articles,

.

the inputs are considered to be the environmental factors surrounding the creatio'lof the
Confederacy, including the Revolutionary War, the economy, and tenitorial disputes,
then the inputs clearly fall within the demand category because those were among the
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primary factors pressuring the American political society to create a new system of
government.
The demands made on the government under the Articles were substantial and
necessitated an equally strong level of support inputs if they were to succeed. As Easton
notes, "For the demands to be processed into outputs it is equally essential that the
members of the system stand ready to support the existence of a political community and
some stable rule of common action that we call the regime" (Easton, 1957, p.394).
Adequate support under the Articles would have included state compliance in funding
and raising troops, coupled with a general willingness to cooperate and work within the
framework of the political system. However, supportive inputs were few and far
between, when any existed at all. Shays' Rebellion, discussed in detail below, is the most
obvious example of the failings of support inputs into the American confederation.
Inputs may "be used as the key indicators of the way in which environmental
events and conditions modify and affect the operations of the political system" (Easton,
1965, p. 114). If the demand inputs are reasonable in relation to the capacity of the
political system, and the requisite support inputs are sufficient to allow the governing
institutions to fulfill the given demands, then the political system stands a greater chance
of operating smoothly over the long term. These conditions were not satisfied under the
Articles, the consequences of which undermined the overall stability of the government,
largely because the supportive inputs were negligible. Easton's observations about the
role of demands and supportive inputs in a political system establish a framework in
'

which one is better able to understand exactly why the Articles of Confederation failed
given the level of inputs into the system.
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The foremost goals of the Articles centered around national defense and security,
followed by the more minor goals of maintaining the general welfare of the newly fonned
union. Initially, due to the Revolutionary War, the states were willing to work together in
the face of a clear external threat. The text of the Articles suggested that this cooperation
would continue and perhaps be enhanced by uniting to facilitate overall internal stability.
Ironically, over time, it was only the more insignificant goals upon which the
confederacy acted successfully, including western expansion and interstate disputes.
When the solvency of the union was truly threatened, the states failed to bind together.
The most immediate and forceful purpose in the creation of the Articles of
Confederation was achieving victory in the Revolutionary War and establishing a sound
base for foreign relations. "The start of a shooting war had called for a centralized
military and diplomatic operations, the latter to win friends abroad and secure foreign
funds and arms" (Monis, 1987, p. 80).
The importance of this goal is evident in the text of the Articles. "Common
defe!Jse" is mentioned first in Section III, and much of the rest of the paragraph addresses
the commitment to unity in times 0 f attack, regardless of the root of aggression against
the United States. Furthermore, much of the authority granted to the national congress
focuses on issues of defense and foreign policy. The enumerated congressional powers
included the right to send and receive ambassadors, to enter into treaties or alliances, to
determine times of war, and, in a limited way, to raise troops for war.
The authors of the' Articles had no choice but to concentrate primarily on defense
""

and foreign affairs, for the centralization of military power was absolutely necessary to
defeat the British and to secure independence. In facl, even prior to the official

--------------------------------------
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ratification of the Articles. efforts were taken to nationalize the military under the first
and second Continental Congresses.
The necessities of war, and the reality of a national unity-the
consciousness of which sharpened as the fighting progressed-plus the
needs of diplomacy and commerce, developed a growing centralization of
authority in fact; the creation and adoption of the Articles represent an
signal demonstration oftrus truth (Aptheker, 1976, p. 8).
Moreover, because the United States was so young and relatively powerless in
relation to other global powers after the war, centralization of defense and foreign policy
helped to present a unified front to the world. One national defense system was surely
more formidable than thirteen separate, smaller, and weaker annies. Because it was vital
to the national interest and the solvency of the newly formed United States, common
defense was the primary goal considered by the au thors 0 f the Articles.
There were several secondary objectives undertaken by the framers of the
Confederation, all of which focused attention within the union. Listed after defense in
Section ill is the desire to provide for the "security of their liberties, and their mutual and
general welfare." Liberty and general welfare are both ambiguous terms and must be
interpreted in the context of the time in which the document was written. To gain insight
into the specific issues that most deeply concerned the creation of a national government,
it is helpful to refer to the most prevalent debates at the time during which the Articles
were drafted and ratified. For example, maintaining the integrity of state sovereignty was
at the forefront of the authors' minds, and so neither phrase can be understood to construe
an activist role for the federal government. Furthermore, the framers of the
"

Confederation addressed substantial common issues of the day that transcended state
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borders. Among these were the weak economy, territorial disputes between states, and
the creation of a basic national infrastructure.
Setting the course for a new country, American political leaders sought to build
and assert economic strength and turned to centralization to facilitate their goal. "During
the Confederation there was endless reiteration of the idea tbat a more powerful central
government would solve the country's economic problems" (Jensen, 1950, p.177). As
the framers of the Articles were drafting the document, the economic situation was
unstable. During the war, the Un.ited States incurred a debt of$42 million, the equivalent
0[$33 billion today (Hanson, 2001). A major objective under the Confederacy was to

eradicate this debt in order to enhance the stability of the economic system. Section XII
of the Articles calls for the federal assumption of the national war debt accrued by the
Continental Congresses:
All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed, and debts contracted by, or
under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United
States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed and
considered as a charge against the United states, for payment and
satisfaction of whereof the said United States, and the public faith are
hereby solemnly pledged (Articles of Confederation).
By providing for the assumption of the national debt, the authors of the Articles hoped to
lead the relief of the economic burden and to stimulate growth within the states. The
attempt at centralization of the debt was at first unsuccessful, and the debt was not paid
until well into the 1800s. However, the men shaping the Confederation clearly felt that
the federal government would be more competent at heading the management of
economic troubles than the thirteen separate states.
Moreover, the Articles delegated the responsibility of managing a national
treasury to the Congress. In this case, economics was used not as an end in itself, but
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rather as a means to fulfill the goal of providing for the general welfare. The authors of
the document realized that the goal of maintaining and enhancing the general welfare
required a central authority to at least guide the states toward common policy objectives.
To pay for expenditures that would inevitably result from Congress's actions in pursuit of
the general welfare, Section vm established a national treasury. Although states retained
responsibility for collecting taxes to fill the treasury, the Articles provided that "all
charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or
general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be
defrayed out of a common treasury." The treasury thus served as a means to fulfill the
objective of preserving the general welfare on a national level.
Another purpose embodied in the general welfare was that of mediating territorial
disputes among the states. As discussed above, western expansion was a critical issue
that nearly blocked passage of the Articles. In order to simply maintain cooperation and
unity among the states, the framers had little choice but to create a mechanism to resolve
territorial conflicts, a primary goal of the Confederation.
Dealings with disagreements over land as well as western expansion were two of
the few areas in which the Confederacy was actually successful in achieving the
established goals. The Articles created a complex and detailed plan for reconciliation of
problems between states. It essentially provided for Congress and the involved states to
[arm an ad hoc judiciary each time two states were in conflict. The decisions of the panel
ofjudges were to be binding on all parties involved. In several instances the process
'

worked to resolve disputes. For example, in 1782, a conflict between Connecticut and
Pennsylvania over the Wyoming Valley was peacefully settled under the process. A
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dispute between New York and New Hampshire over the Vennont territory was also
reconciled under the procedure set forth in the Articles.
Dealing with western territories was not an explicit goal in the Articles, nor was it
directly addressed in any provision. However, by implication, western expansion falls
into the purview of providing for the general welfare. As a byproduct of the ratification
of the Articles, the federal government gained control of most western territory because
the landed states were forced to give up their possessions to placate the states without
western territory. At the time of ratification, western territory made unification a
questionable prospect, and because the federal government gained control of the land, it
fell to the Congress as a primary objective to ensure that the west would no longer be a
deeply divisive issue.
Unlike its failure in many other policy areas, the national government fulfilled
this goal. 'The greatest achievement of the Confederation Congress in the post-war years
was the formulation of plans for the administration of the vast western region that was in
the process of being ceded to the United States by the states that had claims there"
(McCormick, 1997, pA2S). The cornerstone policy was the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, passed just before the dissolution of the Articles of Confederation. When the
landed states ceded their territory to the national government, they did so under the
assumption that the land would eventually be incorporated as several states into the
United States, and the Northwest Ordinance created a procedural framework for this
process. Moreover, the act "ordained six' Articles of compact' between the thirteen
"

original states and the 'people and States' in the new region. These articles set forth
fundamental principles that were to be 'the basis of all laws, constitutions, and
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governments, which forever after shall be fonned in the said territory'" (McConnick,
1997, p. 434). The Northwest Ordinance enumerated a reasonable plan agreeable to each
of the thirteen states to cope with the western lands, thereby achieving the implicit
objective in the Articles of handling the territory in a manner that did not threaten the
unIon.
The [mal maj or obj ective of the Articles of Confederation was that of building a
basic national infrastructure. Much like the issue of western land., a national
infrastructure is only implied io the notion of the general welfare. Nonetheless, it is a
crucial goal because a solid and stable union requires some sort of physical infrastructure
and uniform standards to bind it together on a basic level and facilitate integration.
Several provisions in the Articles call for institutions to fulfill this goal. For example,
Section IX outlines the following powers:
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and
exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck
by their own authority, or by that of the respective states-fixing the
standards of weights and measures throughout the United States
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians ...-
establishing or regulating post offices from one State to anot.her,
throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers
passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the
said office... (Articles of Confederation)
Each of the powers listed above facilitates a fundamental level of national
communication and standards, enabling the union to function under a single government.
Without these powers, the slates would have remained largely disjointed with different
monetary standards as we'l as inadequate means of interstate communication. John
"

Witherspoon, president of Princeton University during the Confederation, mused that if
the colonies did not unite following their victory over the British, ''we may be sure of
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coming off worse" because of the threat of "a more lasting war, a more unnatural, more
bloody, and more hopeless war, among the colonies themselves" (Greene, 1982, p.36).
By encouraging the creation of a sound national infrastructure in the Articles, implicit in
the pursuit of the general welfare stated as a goal in Section III, the framers of the
Confederation encouraged the continuation of the union.
The United States government under the Articles of Confederation slowly fell
apart. The demand inputs on the system were taxing, and supportive inputs were
practically nonexistent. Economic troubles continued to plague the union, and the
Congress had little power to coerce states into complying with national legislation that
had any hope ofrecrifying the situation, including tasks as basic as tax collection and
raising troops when necessary. Attention turned from the ambitious goals addressed
above to the basic objective of salvagjng the union. In fact, "protecting states from
internal rebellion was one of the most pressing national issues in the fall of 1786" (Cain
and Dougherty, 1999, p.234).
No event better illustrates the conditions ofllie day than Shays' Rebellion. Daniel
Shays led a group of farmers to march against the Springfield, Massachusetts, court
house in protest of the burden of higher taxes during a time in which farmers simply
could not payoff their accrued debts. The Secretary of War, Henry Knox, brought the
uprising to the attention of Congress. The congressional committee in charge of the
matter agreed to raise 2,040 troops and declared, "It appears to the committee that the aid
of the federal government is necessary to stop the Progress of the insurgents... and that
'

there is the greatest reason to believe that they ... will reduce that Commonwealth to a
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State of Anarchy and Confusion, [and] probably involve the United States in the
Calamities of civil war" (Cain and Dougherty, 1999,234).
However, Congress could only requisition money and troops from the states with
no actual coercive authority to ensure compliance. In fact, "by January 1787, the lack of
revenue brought the national endeavor to a close. Recruitment ceased in Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Virginja, while lack of funds prevented it from starting in Rhode Island
and New Hampshire. Most of tile southern states never even addressed the issue" (Cain
and Dougherty, 1999, 249).
Massachusetts was left to its own devices to raise an army and end the uprising.
Early in 1787 the state succeeded. Nonetheless, the incident brought the nation
dangerously close to a civil war within one state that had the potential to spill across the
union, because the plight of farmers was hardly constrained to Massachuset1s. As a
result, the primary objective shifted from external defense and foreign policy, with some
degree of internal coordination, to the sheer goal of national solvency. It was during this
time that a new constitution was born to take the place of the failed Articles of
Confederation.
A more minor and inconsequential event also demonstrates the disjointed and

weak nature of the confederation in dealing with both the internal states and foreign
nations. Although Article IX of the Articles granted the national government the right to
send and receive ambassadors, this power like so many others was "limited by the
voluntary compliance and financial support of the state governments "(Olson, 1971,
'

p.llO). When Richard Soderstrom was designated the Swedish consul in Massachusetts,
the state government quickly recognized his position and he assumed his duties, even

sending official notification to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay. However, in the
five-month interim between the state recognition and the eventual congressional
recognition, Soderstrom inadvertently became tangled up in legal action involving
several Massachusetts businessmen. The scandal made its way to the confederal
Congress, at which point the involved members noted that Massachusetts had acted
without authority and preempted the federal government's rote in selecting and
confirming ambassadors. Although there were no important ramifications on the
intemationalleve1, the incident lead several political figures, especially John Jay, to 
reevaluate the balance of state and federal power and the willingness of states to comply
with the Articles. After the incident, Jay mused that he hoped "to see the United States
assume and merit the character of one great Nation," and feared that until the day came,
"the chain which holds us together will be too feeble to bear much opposition or exertion,
and we shall be daily mortified by seeing the links of it giving way and calling for repair
one after another" (Olson, 1971, p.117).
Clearly, with the exception of westem expansion and territorial disputes, by and
large the goals of the Articles were not met. The objectives reflected'an interest in only
the most basic cooperation necessary to ensure the continued freedom of the states. As
illustrated by the fact that the sovereignty clause was located before the basis for
unification in the document, maintaining state independence was clearly the foremost
intent of the framers. The implication is that cooperation was only truly important when
the states were being

tbre~tened;

and even then it was questionable, as evidenced by
'

Shays'Rebellion. Moreover, the Soderstrom incident provides an example of the

difficulty in eliciting state compliance with the Articles in the minor and regular event of
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confinning ambassadors. Easton notes, "If a structured system is to maintain itself, it
must provide mechanisms whereby its members are integrated or induced to cooperate in
some minimal degree so that they can make authoritative decisions" (Easton, 1957,
p.387). The next chapter will discuss how the institutions were inadequate to achieve this
purpose, the result of which was that the supportive inputs were unable to sustain tbe
demand inputs, undermining the stability of the Articles of Confederation as a political
system. First, however, the goals of the European Union must be addressed.

The Goals oJthe European Union
Much like the Articles of Confederation, the idea of a united Europe was born
during an era of war. However, the immediate motivation in Europe was to check
internal continental powers rather than to unite to protect the union from external threats
like those in post-Revolutionary America. Beginning with the Treaty of Paris, the
participating governments set a precedent of including specific goals in the treaties. Over
time, as the member states have grown increasingly comfortable with their desire to
relinquish their sovereignty and with the ED's capability of governance, the scope of the
goals has gradually expanded. Following an analysis of how the Eastonian framework
relates to the aspirations of the European Union, the evolution of this process will be
addressed.
As discussed in relation to the Articles of Confederation, both demand and

.

support inputs are a necessary prerequisite for the stability of a political system, with the
"

caveat that the demand goals are reasonable given the existing structure. Without any
support, a government is unable to sustain, much less fulfill, the demands placed upon it.
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To garner adequate support, "a structured system... must provide mechanisms whereby
its members are integrated or induced to cooperate in some minjmal degree so that they
can make authoritative decisions" (Easton, 1957, p. 387). Over time, the European Union
progressed gradually, altering by varying degrees the structure of its government with
each successive treaty, realizing that as the objectives shifted, so too must the institutions
be altered to facilitate the new goals. Unlike the Articles, which outlined broad and
vague purposes with a rigid procedure to amend the system to fulfill the goals, the
European Union has sought to ensure that its demand inputs are commensurate with its
political institutions, as Easton suggests is necessary to maintain the viability of the
system.
Moreover, the EU has been adept at eliciting support from the member states,
contributing to its ability to facilitate the goals and demand inputs into the system.
According to Easton, as discussed above, th.is is an integral aspect of maintaining the
operation of a government. There are several ways in which the EU has induced member
cooperation. First, the gradual progression of the purpose of the Union, treaty by treaty,
bas helped to prepare members adequately for each new objective and to ensure that the
states are actually ready and willing to work toward the goal. Each nation must approve
a treaty prior to its implementation. Even the process of writing the treaties involves all
member states. Because of the variety of interests represented when fonnulating new
goals and demands on the system, the outcome of the process is likely to represent
moderate and incremental change that all participants are willlng to accept. The slow and
'

deliberate expansion of the goals of the EU has helped to ensure that each nation is
committed to cooperating with the Communjty government to some degree, providing the

- - - - - _ . - ------_._-_ ...
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requisite level of supportive input that Easton suggests is necessary to allow the ED to
function.
Second, the nine states that have joined the European Union since the Treaty of
Rome have become members because they were committed to the notion of a united
Europe for the benefits that it would bring to their own country. Unification and
continual integration were perceived to bring economic benefits through the creation of a
common market, as well as the political benefits of reliable interaction and burden
sharing of common problems. Each state entering the Community had to meet rigorous
economic and political standards. It would have been senseless for the nations to put in
the substantial effort required to join the EU if they were not committed to working
within its framework and abiding by at least its major dictates. The genuine desire to be a
member of the European Union serves as an incentive to cooperate with the ED so as not
to jeopardize a nation's standing within the government.
Third, in a few major policy areas, if a given member state is not prepared to
cooperate, that state has been allowed to withdraw from that part of the union. The most
notable example is that Great Britain and-Denmark have not adopted the single currency,
the eure. A more detailed description of the opt-out procedure will be given in the
following chapter. However, it is important to note that the ability of a state to eschew a
major policy of the Union with which it does not agree enables that state to continue as
an active member in other policy areas by averting a choice between non-compliance
with one policy area and leaving the ED.
"

Finally, unlike the Articles of Confederation, the ED is not funded sporadically by
its member states. In 1970, the ED made the decision to change from a "system based on
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national contributions to one based on its 'own resources'" (Nugent, 1994, p.341).
Monetary resources are now derived primarily from a Value Added Tax levied in the
member states, a duty based on the Gross National Product of the member states,
agricultural levies, and external tariff duties. Although the GNP tax is somewhat like a
national contribution, the other sources of income are very much European in character
giving the EU a financial base independent of the whims of the member states.
The ability to exert authority often demands a reliable source of funding to
implement policy decisions. If the EU's budget were structured such that income had to
be regularly solicited from member state governments, the Union would constantly worry
about alienating a nation and thus endangering its funding. By denying the member
states this leverage over the EU, the Union retains the ability to act independently of
these concerns and act with more autonomy in its interaction with the member states.
These mechanisms to induce support inputs have been vital in enabling the ED to meet
the goals discussed in the following section.
After World War II, Europe faced the daunting task of rebuilding its political and
economic infrastructure. The economic destruction alone was devastating, but the
problem was compounded by a general lack of trust and instability, especially between
Germany and France. Many observers and participants during the time blamed the events
on powerful nationalistic tendencies and felt that, in order to move forward, some level of
interstate cooperation would have to be developed. For example, Jean Monnet
commented, ''There will be no peace in Europe if States are reconstituted on a basis of
"

national sovereignty with all that implies in terms of prestige politics and economic
protectionism" (Salmon, 1997, p.21).
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Underlying this notion was the rationale that some type of supranational
organization would be more effective than mere interstate dialogue in fostering
cooperation and communication among the states. "It was the presumed superiority of
the Community's problem-solving capacity over the potentials of the traditional nationstates which basically motivated the foundation of the Community in the Fifties. In other
words, reasons of efficiency and utility belong to the most significant founding rationales
of the Community" (preuss, 1999, pA22).
Several political motivations existed at the end of World War II. Unification on
some level was perceived to be the best way in which to check excessive nationalism, to
abate fears of a strong Germany, and to cope with the newly fonned Eastern communist
bloc. Nationalism and skepticism about German power were often linked together.
Following German belligerence in the nineteenth century, as well as in the two world
wars, "rightly or WTongly [Germany] had come to be seen as innately aggressive"
(Nugent, 1994, p.18). France, especially, was fearful of German dominance and sought
to check its power in any way possible. At the time ''France needed German coal for its
own recovery plan. But France also wanted to maintain restrictions on the recovery of
Ruhr heavy industry, fearful of competition from German steel. The Germans resented
the contTols imposed upon them" (Salmon, 1997, pAG). Each country was in some
manner restricted by the other and lacked tbe power necessary to achieve its specific
goals. More was to be gained from cooperation than continued conflict. It was partly out
of this tension that the ECSC was formed.
""

Moreover, a deep fear of conununism, and in particular, of the Soviet Union, was
beginning to replace worries about Gennany. Following the division of Gennany into
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western and eastern tenitories, tensions escalated. Largely because of its geographic
proximity to the USSR, Western Europe felt particularly threatened by communism. In
this sense, much as the Articles of Confederation were formed out of a common external
threat (Britain), the individual European nations also believed that a united front, at least
on several economic issues, would be a more effective deterrent to Soviet aggression than
several individual states would be.
Finally, economic motivations played a role in the development of the European
Union. Although initially Western European countries were able to stimulate economic
growth after the war, "the rapid post-war economic recovery that most states were able to
engineer by the adoption of expansionist policies created massive balance of payments
deficits and dollar shortages in particular" (Nugent, 1994, p.19). When the United States
offered economic relief in the form of the Marshall Plan, one of the major stipulations
was that Western Europe had to create an economic organization among the recipient
countries. Out of this grew the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), which, while short-lived, set a precedent for economic integration on the
continent.
The Treaty of Paris, the first to be ratified in the series of European Union
treaties, reflects the above objectives. The preamble states,
Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts
commensurate with the dangers that threaten it. ..
Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can
make to civilizatibn is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful
relations,
Recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements
which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment
of common bases for economic development. ..
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Anxious to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard
of living and further the works of peace ...
Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential
interests; to create by establishing an economic community, the basis for a
broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody.
conflicts; and to Jay the foundations for institutions which will give
direction to a destiny henceforward shared (quoted in Salmon, 1997, pA8).
Reflected in the language is an intense interest in economic integration to preserve peace
in Europe and beyond. At the outset, tbe authors refer to "world peace" and contributions
to "civilization" that extend beyond the geographic boundaries of Europe. The
impending Cold War was at the forefront of political minds at the time, and the USSR
was perceiVed as a threat, likely inspiring the text, "dangers that threaten [world peace)."
As discussed before, Europe felt particularly vulnerable and thus sought to implement
"creative efforts" to preserve its independence as one of the primary goals of the ECSC.
The treaty also contains several lines that strongly emphasize building internal
cooperation to overcome the deep divisions among nations and especially the skepticism
about Germany's intents. Phrases such as "create real solidarity," "resolved to substitute
for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests," "basis for a broader and
deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts," and "destiny
henceforward shared" are all examples of the new drive for collaboration and coherence.
As the power of that language shows, the effort is clearly not merely cosmetic. The
authors of the treaty recognize the severity of past conflicts among the nations and
express not only willingn~ss, but also genuine desire, to overcome the d.ivisions. The
""

means chosen to accomplish this goal were to begin with economic integration and move
forward from the initial point of the ECSC. Although not specific in tenns of numerical
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standards, the preamble of the treaty is specific in a few objectives, including production
expansion and an increase in the standard of living. At this time in the development of
the EU. the specific goals were economic because the countries were not yet prepared to
relinquish political sovereignty.
Although the Treaty of Paris officially created only the ECSC, it is clearly a
forward-thinking document. The 1950 Schuman Doctrine is one source from wruch the
treaty was drawn. Referring to a possible coal and steel union, Schuman stated, "In this
way there will be realized simply and speedily that fusion of interests which is
indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system: it may be the leaven
from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to
one another by sanguinary divisions" (Salmon, 1997, pAS).
The Treaty of Paris also alludes to a Europe that will be integrated beyond a union
of coal and steel resources. A notable aspect of the language is the incremental tone that
it sets. The ECSC is recognized as only the "basis" for further integration, with the
expectation that it is laying "the foundations" for this process. Those driving the
integration process understood that Europe could not be integrated overnight. Political
resistance was too strong, and many major European powers, most notably Great Britain,
showed little interest in the idea. As the Schuman Doctrine expressed, a European
community would have to start small and gradually build on its successes.
Each major treaty since the Treaty of Paris has become more ambitious. For
instance, the Treaty of Rome, while reflecting the goals of the Treaty of Paris, used more
aggressive language. Article II reads,
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,

------~
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to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between the states belonging to it (Nugent, 1994, p.45).
While the text reiterates many objectives set forth in the Treaty of Paris, including
expansion, standards of living, and better relationships among the member nations, it also
moves into new territory by explicitly setting the goal of creating a common market.
Until the Treaty on European Union, enacted in 1992, the primary objectives of the
European Union were economic in nature. However, members of the Communi ty never
lost sight of the original intent to integrate in other policy spheres.
One of the driving philosophies that explains the incremental nature of the
European Union's objectives is the belief that econom.ic i.ntegration will serve as a
catalyst for political integration. Part of the reason for this philosophy is simply
logistical; if decisions are to be implemented some Conn of goveming body must direct
this process. "The major 'history-making' advances in integration have taken the form of
agreeing to integrate aspects of economic activity and then, at times almost seemingly as
an afterthought, realizing that this requires political integration too if there is to be
political direction and control" (Nugent, 1994, p.77). However, various schools of
thought view the extent of political integration differently. For example, prointegrationists, including the head of the German Green Party and German Foreign
Minister, Joschka Fischer, hope that once full economic integration has been realized,
"the complete political in!egration of Europe, and this the abolition of the sovereign
nation states, can hardly be stopped" (Fischer, 1997, p. 19).
While the notion of the complete abolition of nation states is likely farfetched in
the foreseeable future, the Treaty on European Union was the next major step in this
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process. The years between the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty on European Union
brought an expansion of the economic policy areas governed by the EU as well as a few
failed attempts to coordinate other policy spheres, including defense. However, in 1992,
the EU took a major leap forward when the member states agreed to begin to collaborate
i.n the areas of foreign policy and defense, as well as in justice and home affairs. The
Treaty on European Union established three pillars to the European Union. The first
pillar is the European Community, covering the existing treaties~ the second pillar is a
common foreign and security policy (CFSP); and the third pillar is cooperation in the
policy spheres ofjustice and home affairs ORA). The most notable change in objectives
under the first pillar was the creation of a timetable governing the introduction of the
European Monetary Union (EMU), culminating in the use of a single currency introduced
January 1, 1999. This development is especially relevant because the EMU is now a
supranational organization governing all nations that chose to adopt the euro.
The second and third pillars both truly demonstrate the incremental expansion of
European integration. For the first time, the participating nations agreed in a treaty to
collaborate in sign.ificant areas beyond the economic realm. Recognizing the gradual
nature of the process of unification, Article I of the treaty reads, "This treaty marks a new
stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe"
(Treaty on European Union).
First, the member states pledged a substantial amount of cooperation in
international concerns. The treaty declares that the nations shall "define and implement a
'

common foreign and security policy" which "shall include all questions related to the
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which
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might in time lead to a common defense" (Treaty on European Union). This is an
ambitious goal, given the nature of foreign policies. Generally, major decisions relating
to foreign policy and security are considered critical to the retention of a nation's
sovereignty. The treaty recognizes the delicate nature of this issue by using the weak and
uncertain phrase "might in time" with respect to a common military, making the objective
more ambiguous in its scope and meaning. Moreover, the European Union is expected to
work within an existing and complicated framework of international organizations, some
of which are purely European and some ofwhjch are not. For example, the Uruted
Nations, NATO, and the Western European Union (unrelated to the European Union) all
must figure into issues of foreign policy. Finally, the issue of expansion will hamper the
implementation of this goal. Each nation brings its own foreign policy and national
security concerns to the table in the European Uruon, and the more nations involved, the
more complicated the process of creating policy will become. Thus, "In order to work
efficiently and with other structures, it will be important for the EU... to undertake
institutional adjusnnents so that it is not weakened by an expansion of its membership"
(Hojberg, 1996, p.23). Thus far, the EU has experienced some progress and success in
achieving further unity. For example, the EU substantially contributed to the peace plan
following the conflict in Bosnia. The recognition of foreign policy as the second pillar of
the European Uruon broadly expands the original scope of the economic goals set in the
earlier treaties.
The third pillar, JHA, seeks to establish cooperation in crime, drug, immigration,
"

and customs policy. Once again, the objectives reflect a deviation from the traditional
economic goals into areas that are generally handled internally by sovereign nations. The
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major implication is that "a legal base is given to cooperation in areas of activity which in
the past have either been dealt with purely on a national basis or have been the subject of
only rather loose and infonnal cooperation between the member states" (Nugent, 1994,
p.75). JHA is partly a byproduct of the notion that economic integration will breed
political integration. As economies become more intertwined and the freedom of
movement of goods and people expands, immigration and crime become transnational
issues. For example, illegal goods can be transported with greater ease and financial
crimes become less complicated with one uniform currency. Furthermore, as internal
borders are blurred and citizens of EU member states move freely among the nations, it
makes sense to cooperate on the issue of asylum and immigration from non-member
states, also known as spill·over. Thus, JHA serves as a sound example of a goal that is an
outgrowth of the successes of past economic objectives.
Today, the official website of the European Union lists a mission as well as five
primary objectives. The text reads,
The European Union's mission is to organize relations between the
Member States and between their peoples in a coherent manner and on the
basis of solidarity.
The main objectives are:
-to promote economic and social progress (the single market was
established in 1993; the single currency was launched in 1999);

-to assert the identity ofthe European Union on the international scene
(through European humanitarian aid to non-ED countries; common
foreign and security policy, action in international crises; common
positions within international organizations);

.

-to introduce European citizenship (which does not replace national
citizenship but complements it and confers a number of civil and politic
rights on European citizens);
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-to develop all area offreedom, security, andjustice (linked to the
operation of the internal market and more particularly the freedom of
movement of persons);
-to maintain and build 011 established EU law (all the legislation adopted
by the European institutions, together with the founding treaties).
Much of this language reflects a logical extension of the Treaty on European
Union. The second and fourth objectives are essentially the second and third pillars,
respectively. The remaining three objectives reiterate a commitment to continuing
integration by advocating the furtherance of ED legislation and its impact, as well as by
broadening the scope of integration through a European citizenship. Significantly, there
is no timetable attached to the achievement of the aforementioned goals, granting a
degree of flexibility in the process of unification. The objectives will likely be addressed
at the ongoing constitutional convention, however the degree to which they are
implemented will be the subject of contention, given the differing expectations for the
conference.
By and large, the European Union has been successful in fulfilling its objectives.
With respect to economic integration, a single currency has been introduced and a
coounon market has been established in which people and goods generally move freely
among the member states, while non-member states face external tariffs. However, the
standard of living, set as a goal in the Treaty of Rome, is a harder goal to gauge.
Individual European Union countries have different standards of living to begin with, and
the problem is exacerbated by regional differences within nations. The ED has been less
successful in raising the standard of living in some of the poorest regions, altbou£p it
does have a number of programs that reach out to these areas. That the standard of living
has not been uniformly raised is likely not an institutional failure of the European Union.

-------------------~------------
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Within any political territory, especially with a capitalist economy, there are generally
discrepancies in the standard of living that are not easily overcome by the governing
body.
Whether the EU will fulfill its goals of cooperation under its second and third
pillars remains to be seen. The creation of a common foreign and security policy is
clearly a long-term goal that will require substantial sacrifice on the part of the member
states. Cooperation in justice and home affairs is less controversial and thus far has often
worked to the advantage of the individual nations, especially because it is partly a logical
consequence of previous economic integration. However, there is still concern as to
whether national citizenship and immigration laws, will be undermined as collaboration
Increases.
The most critical aspect to note is the incremental process by which the EU
outlined and implemented its objectives, as opposed to creating a supranational body with
all of the current authority at once. This process helped to assimilate states into the
Community and allowed each successive goal to be either an agreed-upon and necessary
area of cooperation or an outgrowth of previous accomplishments, ensuring a more
smooth process of integration. It is with this understanding of the goals of the Articles of
Confederation and the European Union that the study will now tum to the institutions of
each governing body in order to understand how institutions hinder or facilitate
objectives in a confederacy.
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Chapter 4
The institutions of the Articles of Confederation and the European
Union
The Institutions ofthe Articles of Confederation
In the broadest sense, the Articles of Confederation failed because the national
government could never truly exert authority over the state governments. As Articles of
Confederation scholar Merrill Jensen explains,
The vast field of undefined and unenumerated powers lay with the states.
Congress could function only within an area of precisely delegated and
carefully limited authority ... No phrase in the document could be
construed as making the central government supreme over the states ...
The Articles of Confederation placed few restraints upon the states, and
even these tended to be qualified out of existence... The union that had
been created was a federal union of equal states in which the central
organization was carefully subordinated to the members of it (Jensen,
1966, p.241-3).
Had the demand inputs been relatively small and trivial, the power of the national
government would likely have been a nearly irrelevant issue. However, the goals of
maintaining an external foreign policy as well as internal stability required substantial
supportive inputs. The national congress proved itself incapable of eliciting this type of
cooperation from states, as previously illustrated in the description of Shay's Rebellion
and the Soderstrom incident. Much of this failure can be attributed to institutional
features of the Confederation's structure, all leading back to the inescapable conclusion
that it was the lack of power granted to the national government that caused the demise of
the Articles. Included among the institutional inadequacies were the stringent
amendment procedures, causing the Articles to be a relatively static document; tb$lack of
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from the states, creating a free rider
dilemma; the notion that the Confederacy was a union among states and not citizens; and,
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the limited nature of the structure of the national Congress and government, including the
absence ofjudicial and executive branches.

Process of Amendment
First, the Articles of Confederation was a highly rigid document, allowing little
maneuverability to handle and to meet the changing goals of the government. The
Articles were formally ratified in 1781 and a constitutional convention was called in 1787
to create a new foundation for the government of the United States. Within the six years
that lapsed between the ratification and the resounding call for change, political figures
came to realize that not only was the structure of the Confederation flawed, but also that
they lacked the power needed to alter the founding document.
Although the Articles did provide for a means to amend the document, it was an
"exceedingly difficult" process (Aptheker, 1976, p.6). Article xm states, "nor shall any
alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed
to in a Congress o[the United States, and be afterwards confmned by the legislatures of
every State" (Articles of Confederation). The language, especially in the first part o[the
sentence, adamantly discourages any change to the document by stating that the Articles
should never be altered. The actual process for amendment appears almost as though it
were an afterthought, written for only the most extreme cases, given that any change must
be unanimously approved. Because members of the national congress were, in effect,
mere extensions of the state legislatures, an amendment basically required ratification by
state legislatures twice. Differences among the states were extremely pronounced, and
interests varied accordingly. Achieving total consensus among such a diverse
constituency proved to be an impossible task, illustrated by the fact that not a single
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textual change to the Articles was implemented between ratification and the
implementation of the Constitution.
The rigidi ty of the Articles is highlighted when contrasted with Article V of the
Constitution of the United States. Article V states,
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States. shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall
be valid to alllntents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ... (United States
Constitution)
While ratification of the Constitution is by no means easy, the phrase, "deem it
necessary," implies that elected representatives have the authority to determine when a
component of the Constitution is no longer ade<Iuate to meet a given need and to alter the
document in light of the new circumstance. The Constitution is partly an outgrowth of
the Articles, in which the Framers rectified the structural problems of the Confederation.
The change in the procedure of amendment between tbe Articles and the Constitution
illustrates the impracticality of the rigid amendment process implemented during the
Confederation. Most notably, under the Constitution only three-quarters of the states
must approve an amendment, contrasted with the unanimity required by the Articles
(Amar, 1994).
The difficulty of achieving consensus first within the Congress, and then among
the states, irrespective of'the necessity for change, was overwhelming. For example, in
"

1781, Congress was seeking an independent source of revenue to finance the national
debt. Considering that one of the largest failures of the confederal Congress at the time
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was its ability to raise revenue from the states, an independent national treasury could
have altered the doomed course of the Confederation. After exploring several
possibilities, Congress concluded that the best option would be to impose a five percent
duty on all goods imported to the United States, largely to help finance national war
debts. Because, under the Articles, Congress lacked the power to collect such a tax, an
amendment was deemed necessary. Although Congress and twelve states quickly
approved the amendment, Rhode Island held out. In November 1782, the amendment
failed (Jensen, 1950, p.58). That one of the smallest states in the Confederation was
single-handedly able to prevent the passage of an important amendment is a clear
demonstration of the rigidity of the Articles that would eventually serve as an
institutional flaw contributing to the failure of the document.
Enforcement Mechanisms

The second major institutional failure was a lack of enforcement mechanisms that
would have enabled the confederal Congress to elicit compliance from the state
govenunents. As previously mentioned, Easton recognizes enforcement mechanisms as a
critical component contributing to the success of a political system. Once again, he
slates, "If a structured system is to maintain itself, it must provide mechanisms whereby
its members are integrated or induced to cooperate in some minimal degree so that they
can make authoritative decisions" (Easton, 1957, p.387). A political system will be
rendered meaningless if its members disregard decisions made for the whole and, instead,
act independently. Examining this phenomenon i.n the context of the free rider dilemma

"

helps to clarify the magnitude of the impact when a political system cannot persuade its
members to cooperate, especially in the most important situations. The free rider
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problem occurs when an individual actor seeks to derive benefits from a communal
resource without contributing his share of the cost or burden.
In their article, "Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective action and
constitutional design under the Articles of Confederation" (1999), Michael Cain and
Keith Dougherty apply the free rider dilemma to Shays' Rebellion, serving as a profound
example of the inability of Congress to induce the individual states to act, especially in a
time of national crisis. To end Shays' Rebellion,. Congress agreed to raise 2040 soldiers
among the thirteen states. The vote was unanimous, demonstrating the widespread
recognition of the communal need to solve the problem while it was contained in
Massachusetts. However, only Virginia raised troops at the request of Congress, while
Massachusetts waited until it was clear that it needed to act alone as a state to end the
rebellion. Cain and Dougherty's analysis of costs and benefits to the states reveals that
only Virginia, Massachusetts, and Permsylvania had an incentive to contribute troops,
while the other ten slates had a disincentive. As expected, the ten states lacking any
incentive to raise troops made little, jf any, effort to follow Congress's orders. Virginia
and Massachusetts acted as expected, eventually gathering troops, and Pennsylvania
disregarded Congress's directive despite the fact that it had reason to cooperate.
Cain and Dougherty attribute the problem of the free riders to institutional failures
of the Articles. The tax system implemented in the Articles was essentially voluntary.
The national government had no mechanism by which to raise its own money, and
instead relied on contributions from state governments. The ultimate failure of the

"

financial system occurred because "Congress could neither force states to comply with its
requests [or payment, nor prevent states that failed to comply [rom enjoying the benefits 
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of goods supplied by the national government" (Cain and Dougherty, 1999, p.235). In
the case of Sbays' Rebellion, Conwess was unable to elicit cooperation, and all states
eventually benefited from the action of one state without contributing the requested
resources.
Cain and Dougherty argue that the free rider problem had been building over time
because of the basic flaws in the structure of the Confederation. "Without proper
institutional incentives," they maintain, "state actors had no reason to contribute to the
union. As a resul t, the 13 states learned to pursue policies of self-interest which
prevented them from realizing the benefits associated with cooperation, until finally, the
nation was unable to provide even the most basic collective goods, such as protecting the
states from intemal rebellion" (Cain and Dougherty, 1999, p.233). The absence of
enforcement mechanisms rendered the national government nearly powerless in its
already limited capacity to pursue policies for the common good.
National Citizenship

The third major institutional fault pertained to the Articles of Confederation
acting on states and not on citizens. Under the Articles, the national government "was
the creature of the state governments" (Jensen, 1966, p.241). The Articles of
Confederation was ultimately an outcome of a process driven by the Radicals, who
favored a sharply limited national government driven by state interests. To ensure this
structure of government, the Radicals emphasized that Congress would represent states
and not individuals. Rogt!r Sherman of Connecticut made it clear that Congress would be
"

composed of delegates serving as "representatives of states, not individuals," and John
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Witherspoon of New Jersey argued, "Every Colony is a distinct person" (Jensen, 1966,
p.169).
At the heart of tbe argument in favor of Congress representing the states was the
notion that the national government should not act on individuals, implying that
congressional action would not directly affect citizens. Because "individuals were seen
as part of a community, it made little sense to act upon anything other than the
community. To act upon individuals was to imply the destruction of the community"

(Lutz, 1990, p.62).
The preservation of the integrity of the st.ate communities was the foremost goal
of the Radicals as they handled the drafting of the Articles. As a result, Congress could
not implement an order or issue a decision that would affect anything but the states as
political units. States thus remained the dominant political force in the lives of their
citizens, clearly overriding any potential influence exerted by the national government.
For example, Congress was only able to mediate disputes between states, and not
citizens, leaving all judicial questions to the states. The national government had little
influence on the daily lives of the citizens, while the state government became the
predominant force. Individuals thus placed most of their interest in the political
community with the state government, giving them little stake in the survival and
operation of the confederal institutions. The inability to incorporate individual citizens
into the Confederation's political structure further destabilized the power distribution
between the states and
Articles.

th~

national government, contributing to the downfall of the
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StTUcrure of Government

The final institutional inadequacy plaguing the Confederation was the
underdeveloped national level of government, further exacerbating the unequal power
distribution between the state and national governments. Because "decentralized political
structures are likely to inhibit redistributive policies" due to the absence of a central
authority, in a system of government intended to induce sharing and cooperation among
its members, some central authoritative decision-maker must be present (preuss, 1999,
p.42?).

The authority of tile Congress was severely limited, and there was no judicial or
executive branch to substantiate the will of Congress. Although this design fit the initial
purpose of preventing a tyrannical central power, ultimately it helped doom the system to
failure. Part of the strength of the United States government under the Constitution is the
design of the three separate branches of government, each with a unique and necessary
function that contributes to the working of the system. The European Union also
employs a similar format in .that there are separate and distinct branches of the
government, although there is some overlap in the roles fulfilled by each institution. The
division of labor helps to ensure that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions are
satisfied and enforced, regardless of the extent of power held by the level of government
as a whole.
The role of Congress under the Articles can be classified as vague. The body had
legislative characteristics; although its dictates were "not 'laws' by any orthodox usage of
f\..

that tel1tl; the Congress never referred to them as such. Laws ... must be 'attended with
sanction.' No sanctions were possible under the Articles" (McCormick, 1997, pAI9).
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Moreover, Congress served in a limited judicial capacity, as it was only authorized to
mediate mostly territorial disputes between states. The Articles failed to provide for a
formal executive officer. Thus, it remained in the hands of Congress to enforce its will,
which proved nearly impossible due to the absence of coercive mechanisms. Under this
structure, the judicial and executive functions that are so necessary to effective
government, for all practical purposes, were nonexistent. Even if the national
government had been delegated the same limited powers that it was under the Articles, to
have created the two additional branches of the government would have dramatically
increased the national government's ability to function, thereby substantiating its power
relative to that of the states.
Conclusion

Under the Articles of Confederation, the political system was incapable of
properly responding to the demand inputs. The Articles were supposed to facilitate an
environment in which the national government could accomplish major objectives, such
as the coordination of a foreign policy and internal stability. However, the fears of the
authors of the Articles entirely undennined their intentions. Because the rule of Britain
had instilled deep suspicions about a powerful central government, the actual design of
the political system was such that all power rested in the states. Thus, ''whenever it
foresaw conflict with state authorities, the Congress drew back because it had no coercive
power" (McCormick, 1997, p.437). Without any real power in relation to the sovereign
stale governments due to the institutional design of the govenunent, the goals outlined
above proved impossible and Jed to the downfall of the Confederation.
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The Institutions ofthe European Union
Although also a confederacy, the institutional structure o[the European Union is
quite different from that of the Articles of Confederation in the four aspects discussed
above. The European Union maintains a level of flexibility that the Articles lacked.
Basic principles, including supremacy, and d.irect applicability, each described below,
tend to govern the EU, as opposed to rigid statements and limitations like those set forth
in the Confederation. Because the principles leave room for interpretation, they more
aptly mold to the needs of a specific circumstance, contributing to the long-term stability
of the Union.
"The most striking property of the community is its dynamic character... The
Community is ... directed towards its pennanent self-transformation, both in terms of
policy goals and of its institutional setup" (preuss, 1999, 421). This dimension of
flexibility is a vital feature of the European Union because it enables the government
better to accommodate both the demands of the individual member nations, and the
collective and unified demands on the system as a whole. The institutional systems
discussed in relation to the Articles, including the process of amendment, enforcement
mechanisms, the degree to which citizens are incorporated, and the structure of the
supranational government, all illustrate the lasting and dynamic character of the Ell.
Amendment Procedures

.

At first glance, the Union's process of amendment, outlined in Article 48 in the

"

Treaty on European Union, appears to be as rigid, and perhaps more complex, than that
of the Articles of Confederation. It reads:
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The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to
the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the
Union is founded.
If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where
appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favor of calling a
conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States,
the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the
purpose of detennining by common accord the amendments to be made to
those Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the
case of institutional changes in the monetary area.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements (Treaty on European Union, as amended by Amsterdam).
At the heart of the process of amendment is the meeting of the representatives of
the states, often called an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). There have been several
IGCs in the past; the new treaties intended to amend previous documents, including the
Single European Act, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Nice, grew out of
these. The negotiations over the nature of the amendments occur during the IGC.
Given the vastly different interests of the member states, especially because there
is no consensus as to how far integration should go and what fonn it should take, IGCs
are often a tedious and time-consuming process. When participants in an IGC cannot
agree, problems can be taken to the summit at which the actual treaty is drafted.
Once the IGC comes to an agreement on changes to the existing structure and
these alterations have been formally drafted into a single document, each member nation
must ratify the amendments. The process for ratification varies among tbe member
stales. Most simply requrre the approval of the national legislative body, but some
"

countries are moving toward incorporating popular referenda on a regular basis. Because
representatives of the individual nations are active participants in shaping the
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amendments in the IGC, the actual ratification is generally a smooth process when only
the legislatures are involved. However, fierce campaigns must be waged when the public
is permitted to vote on the issue. For example, citizens of Denmark had to vote twice on
the Treaty on European Union because ratification failed the first time. The process by
whjch the European Union can be amended is, especially on the surface, extremely
difficult and complicated. However, since the ratification of the Treaties of Rome, the
structure of the EU has been amended by treaty more than five times, implying that there
are factors beyond the technical amendment process making it more flexible than it
appears, including an incentive to further the process of integration.
The first of these factors, initiated in the negotiations on the Treaty on European
Union, is the use of opt-outs when drafting amendments. Although opt-outs had been
used before in the EU, they had never been implemented in treaty fonn. Opt-outs occur
when a nation is given an exemption from a specific part of a treaty. The most well
known examples are "the opt-outs given to Denmark and the UK on [European Monetary
Union]," illustrating a "tradition of adaptability and innovation" (Nugent, 1994, p.78). In
fact, it was the opt-out granted to Demark that encouraged its citizens to vote in favor of
rati~cation of the

treaty in the second referendum, after the first attempt failed. Another

example is the Schengan Agreement, in which tbe EU nations agreed to gradually phase
out border controls. Britain and Ireland chose to
cooperation.

opt~out

of this framework for

.

Allowing individual states an escape when their representatives feel particularly
"

strongly against a provision permits those states to accept the rest of the amendments
without threaten.ing the entire process by jeopardizing unanimous consent. For example,
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had the UK and Denmark been forced to participate in the EMU, many of the other
important changes, such as the incorporation of the three pillars in the Treaty on
European Union, would have likely failed, as the EU would have been unable to produce
unanimous agreement on the docwnent. Opt-outs offer a level of flexibility that enables
the member nations to feel as though they are still able to act in their national interest
while remaining an active part of the EU, and have thus become a valued option.
"Member governments have bargained fiercely for 'out-outs' ... without which they
would never have been in a position to jump through the hoops of the next stages of
integration" (pryce-Jones, 1997, p.32). The ability to retain independence in one area
while moving forward toward unification in others has, especially in the last decade, been
critical to the continuing evolution of the European Union.
The second factor easing the difficult process of amendment is the basic ideology

that the European Union is not complete in its evolution. While nobody can say for
certain what shape the EU will eventually take, it is commonly accepted by both current
and future members that there will be alterations to the structure that will most likely
further unite the countries to some degree. The Articles of Confederation were viewed in
an entirely different light. Until clear and substantial problems arose leading to the
Constitution, the Articles were never intended to evolve over time in a manner that would
increasingly integrate the states. The document was assumed to be the fInal structure of
the government. Under the European Union, however, the member states are aware that
the process of integration'is not yet complete, and have thus come to expect and accept
~

amendments to the founding documents. As a result, while the individual countries by no
means agree on the exact content of the changes, they are willing to be active participants
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in the amendment process with the ultimate expectation that they will ratify whatever
alterations they have come to agree to in an IGC.
Each of the factors described above helps to soften a seemingly rigid and difficult
process of amendment. By making the process more flexible, the European Union can
more easily adapt and respond to changing conditions, as well

as continue the goal set

forth in the Treaty of Paris to create a "destiny henceforward shared."

Enforcement Mecbanisms
The second institutional feature contributing to the stability of the European
Union is the more stringent use of enforcement mechanisms. Two principles articulated
by the European Court of Justice helped to lay the foundation for member state
cooperation. The first is the principle ofdirect effect, and the second is the supremacy

doctrine. Briefly, the Court of Justice is the ultimate legal authority in the European
Union. Much like the Supreme Court in the United States, the ECl's rulings are final.
The member states have a long tradition of abiding by the decisions of the ECJ, and
therefore the doctrines articulated by the justices in their decisions are generally respected
and upheld.
In 1963, the European Court of Justice issued a decision in N V. Algemene

Transport en Expedite Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlanse Administratie der
Belastingen (26/62 [1963] ECR, 34) (vall Gend & Loos), that created the principle of
direct effect in the European Union. In this case, the Court was forced to decide whether
the treaties applied solely to the member states as a whole entity, or whether individuals
"

would also have recourse under European law. Furthennore, it raised the issue of
whether EU directives bad to be implemented into member state law by national
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legislatures or whether they would automatically be incorporated into national legal
systems upon passage at the Community level. The Court sided with van Gend & Loos,
making European Union treaties directly applicable to both the nations and their citizens,
thus creating "rights which individuals could claim in their national courts" (Alter, 1996,
pA58). The ECl went one step further. The judges also declared that once the ED
passed a law, it was immediately applicable in the member states. There was no need for
the individual nations to incorporate EU law into their domestic law; it would take hold
upon its enactment at the community level.
Vall Gend & Loos had tremendous repercussions. Because it is not always in the

national interest of an individual member state to enforce all ED laws and directives,
nations are not always compelled to implement Community law. The vigilance of
individual citizens is an important counterbalance to this tendency. It is a natural action
for a person to seek either a remedy for or an improvement of a situation. Should a
citizen feel that his or her position would be bettered through the enforcement of ED law
when it is not being properly implemented., there is a strong possibility that the person
will tum to the courts to effect a change in the situation. As a result of the principle of
direct effect, "individuals in real cases and controversies became the principle guardians
of the legal integrity of Community law within Europe" (Deelen, 1996, p.81). Citizens
can do a great service to the ED simply by acting in their own self-interest and prompting
the implementation of Community law, thereby creating a form of enforcement
mechanism in the

Europe~

Union.

"

Moreover, Van Gend & Loos overcame a major potential stumbling block to the
authority of the European Union. National legislatures are generally notorious for their
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ability to block the passage and implementation oflegislation. Were it the case that all
fifteen of the national legislatures had to pass ED laws prior to its taking effect, it would
be legitimate to infer that Union law would rarely be enforced across all states,
undennining the legitimacy of the ED. The situation would have been similar to that
under the Articles of Confederation, in which it was left to the state legislatures to
authorize and implement the decisions of Congress. Because EU laws simply take effect
upon passage at the supranational level, the individual nations cannot choose to ignore
laws by not addressing or them in their legislatures. As a result, the member states are
generally forced to at least acknowledge EU taws.
In 1964. the European Court of Justice took a second step toward creating
enforcement mechanisms in the European Union in Costa vs. ENEL (6/64 [1964] ECR,
1141). In this case, an individual shareholder in the Italian electricity company, ENEL,
challenged an Italian nationalization law on the grounds that it conflicted with numerous
provisions of the European Union treaties. The Italian government maintained that it
should be able to apply its national laws without consideration of ED law. The Court
sided with the shareholder stating, ''The transfer by the states from their domestic legal
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a
subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of Community cannot prevail"
(Deelen, 1996, p.St).
The Eel understobd that for the legislation of the EU to take hold, the law must
~

be uniformly applied across the Union. It would result in chaos if each nation could
choose how to apply EU laws, what ED laws to apply, and when to apply them. The lack
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of consistency would wreak havoc on the stability of the government, entirely
uodennining its authority. Its decision, in essence, ruled that ED law would always be
supreme over any past, present, or future legislation that a member state had enacted or
may pass conflicting with Community law. This ruling, therefore, "set Community Jaw
up as a superior-level nonn throughout the Community" (Dehousse, 1998, p.67). By
legally establishing that a member state cannot subvert ED law by implementing its own
legislation, the Union created yet another means to ensure compliance with its dictates.
The Commission is generally the branch of the European Union responsible for
building on these foundations and ensuring compliance with Union law. Article 211 of
the Treaty of Rome, as amended by Amsterdam, reads that it is the duty of the
Commission to "ensure that the provisions of thjs Treaty and the measures taken by the
institutions pursuant thereto are applied." Guiding the Commission in its actions are the
four variations of legislation that may be enacted, laid out in Article 249 of the Treaty of
Rome, as amended by Amsterdam. It states:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of
thjs Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the
Council and the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives,
take decisions, make recommendations, or deliver opinions.

A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shalll1e binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
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The gradation of legislation clearly prioritizes some acts as more forceful than others.
The word "binding" implies total compliance. Such strong language was not used in the
Articles of Confederation wi th respect to the powers of the national government. By
permitting some legislation to be a mere recommendation with no real force behind it, the
treaty provides an outlet for legislation that gets passed, but that may prove to be difficult
to enforce in a few specific states. Once again, this is an element of flexibility built into
the institutional structure, allowing states to essentially opt out of recommendations and
opinions with which it does not agree.
The exact role of the Commission is outlined in Article 169 of the Treaty of
Rome, as amended by Amsterdam. Once the Commission is made aware of possible
violations in incorporating or applying EU law, it notifies the state and conducts a formal
investigation to ensure that the claim of a breach is legitimate. Violations may include
"not noti fying the Commission of measures taken to incorporate directives into national
law, for non-incorporation or incorrect incorporation of directives, and [or nonapplication or incorrect application of EU law" (Nugent, 1994, p.113). Upon verification
of the violation, tbe Commission "shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State
concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice" (Treaty of
Rome, as amended by Amsterdam). The Court may then impose a financial penalty if it
detennines the state to be'guilty of non-compliance. Neit! Nugent offers a numerical
account of a typical year of violations ofEU law.
Most cases, it must be emphasized, are settled at an early stage. So, in an
average year, the Commission issues around 800 letters of formal notice,
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delivers 200 reasoned opinions, and makes 80 references to the Court of
Justice... One reason for so many early settlements is that most
infringements occur not as a result of willful avoidance of EU law but
rather from genuine differences over interpretation or from national
administrative and legislative differences that have occasioned delay
(Nugent,1994,p.114).
The

f~ct

that only 10% of cases make it to the Court of Justice is indicative of the general

willingness of the member states to comply with the European Union. However, the
leverage of a formal investigation, as well as the possibility of a financial penalty, is an
adequate enforcement mechanism for the instances in which violations ofEU law do
occur, contributing to the stability and uniformity oflegislation in the European Union.
European Union Citizenship
The third institutional factor relating to the stability of the EU is the creation of a
European citizenship. Part Two (Articles 17-22) of the Treaty of Rome, as amended by
Amsterdam, details a new European citizenship, created in the 1990s. Article 17 states,
"Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of
a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall
compliment and not replace national citizenship. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the
rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby."
Among the specific privileges conferred on the citizens include the right to vote in
European Parliament elections, the right to run for a seat in the EP, the right to move
freely among other member states, and the right to petition the EP and correspond in
writing to all branches of ~he EU government and receive a response in the appropriate
language.
The concept of a European citizenship helps to create a feeling of belonging,
uniformity, and solidarity in the ED, which, in turn, fosters long-term stability. One
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benefit of citizenship is that it enables individuals to exact specific benefits from the
system, such as freedom of movement and the right to vote, that give them a stake and an
interest in the government shared equally among all people. Speaking of citizenship in
the European Union, Percy B. Lehning claims:
If citizens of any sub-unit perceive that they are unfairly disadvantaged or
that they are under-represented in key supranational, federal institutions,
of there is a lack of mutual understanding and mutual distrust, these
factors may have the potential to destabilize a union. It is reasonable to
suppose that a federation based merely on a modus vivendi---one in which
pan-national identification, tolerance and solidarity do not develoJ:r-will
remain inherently unstable (Lehning, 1998, p.364).

Citizenship is a vehicle through which the institutional system of the European
Union forms a common denominator among all individuals, regardless of nationality.
Moreover, the simple fact that the European Union is able to grant a citizenship from
which specific benefits may be derived suggests that it is an authoritative governing body
working in concert with the member states. For example, it is the ED that enables
freedom of movement among states by guaranteeing that right to its citizens. As stated in
the text of the treaty, the citizenship is intended only to enhance national citizenship and
not to supplant it. This provision ensures that the characteristics of the ED as a
confederacy remain intact because the act of sovereignty implicit in granting citizenship
is neither violated nor overridden. The benefits of ED citizenship to the Union are clear
in that it helps to establish a sense of belonging and interest in the institutional
government, which contributes to the stability of the system.
Structure of Government

The final institutional factor relating to the operation of the European Union is the
existence of tegjslative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. The EU is
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notorious for the complex and often disorganized structure of its supranational
government. Among the four primary branches, the Commission, the Council of
Ministers, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice, all three functions are
adequately filled. Generally speaking, the Commission acts as the executive branch, the
Council and the EP share the role of legislator, and the Court of Justice fulfills judicial
duties. In addition, the European Council, composed of the heads of state of each
member nation, meets at least twice a year to address major policy issues and concerns in
the European Union.
Interaction among the five bodies occurs on a regular basis. The Commission is
responsible for initiating the legislative process. The Council and the EP share the task of
passing laws, with the allocation of power determined by the type oflegislation being
considered. For example, while the EP is not consulted in the process of ratifying trade
and other international agreements, it has veto power in legislation considered with the
Council under the co-decision procedure. The Commission then oversees
implementation, and the Court of Justice has the authority to hear cases regarding EU
law, resolving disputes or clarifying points of ambiguity in the legislation. The European
Council may lead the process of legislating on particularly contentious issues by
negotiating compromises among the heads of state. The system is not based upon the
merits of separation of powers or checks and balances as it is in the United States, yet
they are similar by virtue of the fact that the power to pass and implement legislation is
divided among several bo'dies. What is important for this study, however, is that the EU
is capable of performing legislative, executive, and judicial duties.

"
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The importance of executing all three duties of a government is clear. Laws need
to be created, implemented, and clarified if they are to succeed in achieving their
purpose. If a government is incapable oflegislating with the intent of fulfilling the duties
for which it was created, 'the political system is rendered meaningless. All three functions
are integral to the successful operations of a government. If one oftbese tasks is not
completed, a confederal government risks not only inconsistency in the way it influences
its members, bUI also partial or complete subversion of any policy it authorizes, the effect
of which is to undermine the ability of the government to perform the duties that it has
been created by the member slates to undertake.
Conclusion

The European nations are growing increasingly closer together. Their economies
are now inextricably linked as a result of the introduction of the euro, and their political
situations are also growing together. The nations may soon create some form of defense
coalition, and they are cooperating in an ever-closer sense on matters ranging from
criminal justice to covert intelligence gathering. As the member states become
increasingly dependent and cooperative, it makes less and less sense for tbem to subvert
the governmental structure that facilitates this unity. The situation in the European Union
is thus vastly different from that of America under the Articles. At that time there was no
economic interdependence upon which to build, and that is essentially how the European
Union began to grow and become what it is today. The incentive to cooperate generated
by tbe notion of interdependence has created an environment in which it simply makes

"

sense to work together within the institutional framework of the European Union. The
institutional features discussed above all playa role in facilitating interaction among the
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member states in such a way that the long-term stability of the EU is continually
strengthened.
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Cbapter 5
Attributes of a Successful Confederacy and Conclusion
In his article comparing federations and confederations, Daniel Elazar notes the

tension under the Articles of Confederation between the league and federal elements of
the government. While implementing a governing body on the national level> the
structure of the Articles remained such that it was simply a loose organization of states
with few rules and institutions binding them together.
The difficulties-often fatal-of confederation flow from this basic
tension. In our consideration of whether confederation can be a viable
federal option, we must raise the question as to whether (or under what
conditions) the confederal tension can be sustained in a polity on a long
term basis. This is a real issue in the European Community today (Elazar,
1982, p.7).
Twenty years have passed since Elazar wrote his article, and the European Union
continues to confront the same basic issue. Although the EU is gravitating increasingly
toward a federal structure, it remains a confederation at this point in time, experiencing
the challenge of balancing its federal elements with the independence and sovereignty of
the member nations. Thus far, the European Union has managed the tension well, as
demonstrated by its continuing stability and evolution toward further unification. This
accomplishment would not have been possible without an institutional structure
conducive to governing a confederacy, which is precisely what the authors of the EU
treaties have accomplished.
The pattern of development of the European Union bas certainly been plagued by
numerous problems, given the self-interested behavior of the member states that
'

occasionally is powerful enough to derail the operation of the ED. For example, the
Empty Chair Crisis, in which France abstained from most decision-making procedures in
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the EU, resulted in the passage of the Luxembourg Compromise requiring unanimity in
decisions of major importance (see page 29 above). The Compromise was eventually
disregarded after the passage of the SEA. Incidents such as the Empty Chair Crisis are to
be expected in a system of government in which state interests are often seen as superior
to those of the system of government as a whole. However, when institutions are
adequate to fulfill the goals of the governing body, and when they foster both cooperation
among the member states and a way in which to enforce the authority of the government,
the confederation is likely to remain a viable governing system over the long term.
The Articles of Confederation did not meet the criteria stated above. The
institutions of the national government simply were not adequate to handle the demands
placed on the system by the member states. This claim is evidenced by the changes
implemented in the current United States Constitution, which largely grew out of the
failures of the Articles.
. ' .the Preamble to the 1787 Constitution specified that what is proposed is
the establishment of a 'more perfect union,' not a new one. What was
changed were the means for effectuating the union, which required the
expansion of the powers granted to the federal government even in order
to obtain already agreed upon ends (Elazar, 1982, p.6).
As Easton notes, "The reason why a political system emerges in a society at all-that is,
why men engage in political activity-is that demands are being made by persons or
groups in the society that cannot all be fully satisfied" (Easton, 1957, p.387). When the
demand inputs could not be accommodated under the Articles, the nation's leaders
drafted the Constitution. •

....
The problems with the Articles of Confederation were clearly centered around the
means to achieve the stated goals. Not only was there no way in which to enforce the
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dictates of Congress, but there was also a pervasive sense of state sovereignty. The
combination of these characteristics undermined the authority of the political system.
The adamant determination to preserve state sovereignty, stated in Article II, interfered
with achieving the level of cooperation necessary to maintain the system. Exacerbating
the problem were the institutional failures discussed in detail above: inability to amend
the Articles, a lack of citizen participation, and the limited structure of the federal
government.
As a result, the American government began to unravel. Minor occurrences such

as the Soderstrom incident, in which the simple lack of communication between a state
and the national government caused international embarrassment, demonstrate small
flaws with the system (see page 45 above). Ifbasic tasks such as informing the national
government of a recently appointed consul were not accomplished under the Articles, it is
difficult to envision the ability of the system to create a coherent foreign policy to which
all states would agree to adhere. The national government simply lacked the authority
and power of enforcement to establish regular channels of communication and
procedures that would have created norms of interaction between the two levels of
government. States jealously guarded their sovereignty because they were fearful of a
strong central government, and there was little Congress could do to create a common
interest and policy to which the vastly different thirteen states would subscribe.
Moreover, the near overthrow of the Massachusetts government during Shays' Rebellion
demonstrates one of the fatal flaws of the Articles. There was no way in which Congress
~

could entice or coerce the other states to act on behalf of Massachusetts and preserve the

87
intemal order of the confederation. As a result, the system of government nearly fell
apart.
As Easton explains, "For the demands to be processed into outputs it is equally
essential that the members of the system stand ready to support the existence of a
political community and some stable rule of common action that we call the regime"
(Easton, 1957, p.394). Easton distinguishes between two types of recipients of support in
a political system. The first is the political community and the second is the regime. A
political community is composed of individuals and groups under the rule of a single
government, while a regime is the form of the government itself. Both are equally
important in a government's ability to function effectively, transfonning demands and
support into adequate outputs. Without support for the political community a
government is rendered meaningless because there is neither a desire nor a consensus
among the members to act together to achieve common goals through a governing
structure. Likewise, if there is no support for the regime, the common goals have no
means by which they may be achieved, also making the government irrelevant.
Under the Articles, there was support for the political community; however,
support for the governing regime was negligible. The states, and the citizens of the
several states, clearly recognized the potential benefits gained from creating some form
of central government. In fact, they had been working together since before the
Revolutionary War to achieve independence. However, when they created the Articles of
Confederation there was only a limited understanding of how to balance state sovereignty
with the power of the national government. The American states were new to
independence and guarded their sovereignty too fiercely, despite the understanding that a
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political community would benefit all. When a state felt that it could take advantage of
the free rider principle and reap the benefits of the political community without paying
the costs, it did so. Upon realizing the extent of the failure of the Articles, the states did
not pull apart, but rather, they unified further under the Constitution, demonstrating a
consensus in favor of maintaining a political community.
The collapse of the Articles was due to the ineffectual institutions of the regime
that encouraged and facilitated independent state action. The member states simply did
not grant an adequate level of support to the regime on most levels, ranging from
consultation in the Soderstrom incident to the provision of troops during Shays'
Rebellion. Exacerbating the problem was the impotent confederal government, unable to
coerce state action. No amount of support for the political community, regardless of how
strong it may have been, was enough to counterbalance the lack of support for the
regime, causing the downfall of the Articles. The era of confederation ended in the
United States, replaced by a federal political system. The change occurred not because
confederacies are inherently unable to sustain themselves as governments over the long
term, but rather because of specific flaws built into the regime under the Articles.
The European Union, however, is a nearly opposite case. When the EU was
founded there was very little existing support for the notion of a political community.
The continent had just emerged from years of destructive and divisive warfare, and the
environment was one of distrust and contempt. Moreover, unlike the American states
during the Revolutionary War, who shared a similar background under British rule, the

"

European nations had histories that clearly identified each one as deeply unique. For
centuries, the European states acted as fully sovereign and independent states, cultivating

89
their own cultures. Generally, the only time that sense of sovereignty was threatened was
when one European nation acted aggressively against another. While the idea of
unification after World War II may have been appealing to preserve and maintain peace,
the sense of political community clearly had yet to develop among the member states.
However, the regime picked up nearly immediate support. States were willing to
serve as active participants in the institutions of the ECSC government, engaging in
productive cooperation that eventually led to the European Union as it is known today.
The six founding nations acted together to create a common market for coal and steel,
setting a precedent for supporting the goals of the government and acting accordingly.
The growth of the scope of the regime has brought along side it increasing support for the
political community. The introduction of the euro, for instance, demonstrates willingness
on the part of most member states to forgo their national currencies, and with them part
of their national identities, in favor of a common monetary system. The euro is an
example of support that transcends the regime into the political community because of
the degree to which it invades national sovereignty and culture. Absent a strong desire to
create an increasingly united political community, the idea of a common currency likely
would have failed. As a result of the development of support for the political community
in conjunction with existing support for the regime, the EU has a stable foundation on
which to govern successfully.
Whjle the notion of a uruted Europe engenders considerably more support than it
did fifty years ago, there is still a distinct national sentiment in Europe. Regardless of
"'"

any recent progress made toward integration, the EU will still retain the characteristics of
a confederacy in the foreseeable future. Despite the appearance of a few institutions
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within the ED that make it seem federal (namely the euro and the ECJ), the nations of
Europe are by and large still sovereign states protective of their strong national identities.
These char,!cteristics will ensure the continuation of the European Union as a
confederacy for many years to come.

Lessons ofthe AI1icles of Confederation Applied to the European Union
The lessons that can be gleaned from the Articles of Confederation and applied to
the European Union about what enables a confederacy to succeed are four-fold. First,
and what may be considered the Qverarching lesson, is that the institutions of the
govenunent must be suitable to the goats set by the founders. Second, the national
government must have the capability to execute legislative, judicial, and executive
functions to help ensure that all legislative duties are carried out and reinforced by the
executive or judicial branch when necessary. These institutions do not necessarily need .
to have power distributed equally among tbem; rather, each function must only be
fulfilled on a basic level. Third, there must be adequate enforcement mechanisms to
elicit at least a basic level of compliance from the members of the system. Finally, an
amendment procedure must exist that is not so stringent as to preclude the possibility of
amendment during cases in which the government must be altered.
There is a clear difference between the European Union and the Articles of
Confederation with respect to the integration of the [our institutional characteristics,

.

illustrated by the following table.
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Articles of Confederation

European Unjon

Legislative, executive,
judicial capabilities

Objectives overwhelmed the
capabilities of the
institutional structure
No executive and extremely
limited judicial capacity

Institutions change to
accommodate evolving
objectives
All three functions fulfilled

Adequate enforcement
mechanisms

None provided to national
government

Appropriate process for
amendment

Too rigid to aHow for the
possibility of change

Treaties explicitly outline
process to enforce ED
policy
Flexible and encourages
negotiation to find a
common solution

Institutions must be suitable
to objectives

First, the EU has gradually evolved over time, both in tenns of its structure and
goals. With each new treaty has come a new set of objectives. and the EU has been
careful to modify its institutions to fit the changing demands on the political system. Part
of the evolutionary process has been the emerging sense of a political community
discussed above. The more comfortable the members are with the political community,
the more likely it is that integration will proceed on at least a minimal level. However,
the stronger support for the political community does not imply a willingness to entirety
relinquish national sovereignty.
The most recent treaty, drafted in Nice and currently in the process of ratification,
is an excellent example of tills process. Participants in the EU were aware that the
institutions were not created to accommodate an organjzation composed oftwenly to
thirty member states. However, as the horizons for expansion continued to broaden, and
the integration of new meinbers became an important goal, the EU moved toward altering
"'

its structure to facilitate the successful implementation of its expansion objective. The
summit held at Nice produced a treaty document that did not completely overhaul the
ED, but implemented changes that will help to ease the transition into a much larger
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body. Nice provides an example of the Union making a conscientious effort to ensure
that its institutional structure wilt be adequate to sustain the influx of members over the
next ten years. The stability of the government was not jeopardized, as most of the
changes were incremental by nature, rather than dramatic. The ability of the EU to both
recognize and act on the need for change in its institutions is critical in providing for the
long-term success of the government.
The second feature of a successful confederacy is the capacity to carry out
legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Each aspect of governing reinforces the
efficacy and stability of the political system, especially with respect to its capacity to
legislate effectively.

The American government under the Articles had no executive

authority and extremely limited judicial authority. Legislation, therefore, may have been
passed, but often floundered during implementation making it impossible to achieve any
stated objectives. The goals of a political system demand that legislation be passed and
properly executed. In the EU, the focus on economic and political integration requires
acts oflaw to drive the process, and careful monjtoring to ensure compliance. Goals such
as achieving a cornmon market will simply not be realized if a single member state does
not follow the law, for the elimination of tariffs and impediments to the free movement of
goods and persons demands that the barriers be uniformly removed. Thus, equally
important in the process is an executive to oversee implementation and ajudicial body to
clarify misinterpretation of legislation and provide a legal basis for consistent action
throughout the confederacy.
"

Legislative, executive, and judicial capacities serve as the support structure for the
entire system of government because a political system revolves around the ability to
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carry out all three tasks. Inability to perform anyone of the functions potentially
weakens a system to the point that it can no longer act effectively. The Articles of
Confederation faltered because the national government was unable to induce
cooperation to carry out its objectives, largely due to the absence of an executive
authority to assist in implementation. A confederacy is rendered useless at the point
when it can no longer accomplish the goals for which it was set up to achieve. Therefore,
the success of a confederacy is partly contingent upon adequate legislative, executive,
and judicial capacities.
The third criterion used to ensure a stable confederacy is the existence of
enforcement mechanisms. Without enforcement mechanisms, as the Articles of
Confederation demonstrated., the govemment has no means by which to exact compliance
from its members, ultimately leading to the inability of the political system to function
effectively. Under the Articles, states were essentially free to act as they desired without
regard to the implications for the confederation and the other states, rendering the
political system totally vulnerable to free riders. The confederal Congress simply had no
means by which to impose its will on the member states. However, as discussed in the
previous chapter, not only does the EU have a textual basis for enforcement in its
founding documents, but it also has a theoretical basis grounded in opinions issued by the
Court of Justice, as well as practical incentives that serve as a foundation for cooperation
among the member states.
Establishing a means to coerce or induce cooperation is a deterrent to the free
'

rider dilemma. If each member of a confederacy has as strong incentive to cooperate,
separate from the possible contribution to the nation's interest, no member will be able to
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reap the benefits of the system without paying any of the costs. Moreover, inaction in a
policy area simply becomes a non-option. The total effect is to provide a level of
uniformity of governance across the member states, which is essentially the purpose of a
creating a government that unites several components to a specified degree. Without an
enforcement mechanism, states will often act in their own interest when they do not
perceive that benefits will be derived from the policies of the con federal government.
Consequently, the confederacy becomes irrelevant because it can be overridden by the
actions of one state alone, entirely refuting the purpose of creating a higher level of
government.
The final attribute of a successful confederacy is the capability to amend the
founding documents of a political system when necessary. The process for amendment
contained in the Articles was highly rigid. All states had to agree, but there was no
mechanism to facilitate discussion and negotiation among the states prior to amendment.
Despite the institutional failings of the Articles, no changes were made until the
document was replaced by the Constitution, recreating the entire system of government.
The ED, on the other hand, has a more pragmatic process of amendment, allowing
the government to conform to the demands placed the institutions. Although it may seem
stringent, the EU has produced a series of important treaties since the 1950s following the
established process. By first convening a forum in which to discuss the content of
possible changes, the IGC, the Union provides an opportunity for all parties to voice their
opinions and negotiate a middle ground. Although reaching consensus at the rGCs is

"

often time-consuming and tedious, it helps to prevent alienation of member states from
the decision-making process, fostering the sense of a political community, and increases
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the likelihood that the alterations will be ratified (recall page 71 above). By enabling the
process of amendment to function within the institutional framework of the political
system, the ED minimizes the risk of debilitating its authority should the government
become unable to process the demand inputs and ensure the presence of support inputs.
Because the ED is has evolved in an incremental manner, it is vital that it be able to
change its institutions to cope with a new scope of authority. A viable procedure for
amendment facilitates the level of flexibility necessary for a political system to succeed
over an extended period of time.
The need for an adequate amendment process is especially important due to the
nature of confederacies. Confederacies have varying levels of authority invested in them,
with a substantial portion vested in the sovereignty of the members. As a result, they are
more fluid in nature because their actions depend on the whims and interests of the
members. Maintaining commitment to a loose political organization requires the
continued cooperation of the individual components, manifested in support for both the
political community and the regime. One way in whjch cooperation is maintained is
through the knowledge that the system can be changed if it is not functioning as intended
or if it is threatening the immediate interests of the members. This understanding adds a
degree of flexibility to the system that enables the member states to vary their positions
and attitudes toward the ED without jeopardizing the overall stability of the government.
For example, the Luxembourg Compromise, authored by the French,
implemented unanimous voting in many policy areas. It was eventually deemed
"

inappropriate because it hindered the operations of the ED and prevented policies from
being passed and implemented. In response, the Single European A~t was passed with
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the consent of the French to rectify the problems caused by the unanimous decisionmaking process. Thus, the French were able to alter their stance on the level of policymaking authority held by the ED and to see the actual operation of the ED change
accordingly.
The sovereignty of the member states in the ED is an important feature of the
political system, as is the case in any confederacy. A practical system for amendment
enables the countries to determine and change their positions on structural or policy
issues and enact the alterations, providing that consensus can be reached on the
amendment. This ability allows nations to make sovereign decisions that influence the
confederacy, which is an important contribution to the flexibility of the government and,
thus, its ability to exist in the long run.

Conclusion
The Articles were a static and rigid document, unsuitable for the time in which
they were enacted. State interests were dominant, and a strong emphasis was placed on
preventing the national government from becoming a powerful central authority. There
was no institution in the Articles that counterbalanced this mentality, and the national
government conseq uently became prisoner to the whims of the states. In a 1787 speech
addressing the need for a new constitution, Dr. Benjamin Rush of Philadelphia stated,
The confederation, together with most of our state constitutions, were
formed under very J,lnfavorable circumstances. We had just emerged from a
corrupted monarchy. Although we understood perfectly the principles of
liberty, yet most of us were ignorant of the forms and combinations of
'
power in republics. Add to this, the British army was in the heart of our
country... We forgot the temple of tyranny has two doors. We bolted one of
them by proper restraints; but we left the other open, by neglecting to guard
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against the effects of our own ignorance and licentiousness (Essential
Documents, 1997).
The Articles were a shortsighted document narrowly tailored to the immediate demands
of the moment as opposed to the long-term structural needs of a government. The
authors failed to recognize the need for a more flexible founding document that would be
amenable to changes in the general direction of the government over the long run.
Instead, the institutions proved totally inadequate to handle even the objectives set forth
initially.

In stark contrast to the Articles is the European Union. A 1995 report issued by
the EU proclaimed,
The new internal and external context in Europe calls for responses that
will ensure greater political stability while simultaneously allowing
economic development and a social climate of solidarity to be safeguarded
in an open, global and competitive economy, in other words responses that
will put the European Unjon in a position to continue acting as the
principal factor of peace and prosperity on the European continent
(Salmon, 1997, p.275).
The vision for the future of the European Union is ambitious. The EU has clearly played
a vital role in maintaining peaceful relations among the European nations through the
difficult process of forging economic and political union, as it set out to do in the 1950s.
Acting as a confederacy has been an effective structure of government for these purposes.
The European states, with long and distinct histories, have retained a substantial amount
of sovereignty, preserving their national interest and culture. While fi fly years into the
creation of the United States there was distinctly American identity, citizens of the EU
still consider themselves as Italian, Greek, Portuguese, or whatever their nationakty may
be. They will not relinquish this national identity in the foreseeable future. However, the
supranational government was sufficiently strong and authoritative to achieve the goals
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set forth both initially and as they gradually evolved over time. Moreover, the founding
treaties have been altered to conform to the changing demands on tbe political system as
the scope of the goals has evolved from coat and steel unity to fuller economic and
political integration. As the European Union expands, it faces the challenge of nearly
doubling its membership. Over time, the structure of the government is likely to evolve
beyond a confederacy into a federal system. Those at the forefront of the evolution
should draw lessons and guidance from the successes of the confederacy over the past
fifty years in order to ensure a smoother path toward integration in Europe.

Easton's idea that a successful government must receive support for both the
political community and the regjme is critical. The experiences of the Articles of
Confederation and the European Union indicate that support for the regime must either
come first or be developed simultaneously with support for the political community.
Under the Articles, mere support for the political commun.ity was not adequate to
compensate for the deficiency in support for the regime, as well as the institutional
inadequacies of the regime. Without enforcement mechanisms, states were left to exploit
the free rider dilemma, despite support for the political community. Support likely
derived from the belief that benefits were to be incurred from the community, and if the
benefits could be obtained without paying the costs, then the state took advantage of that
loophole. Thus, the institutional fai lures of the Articles only served. to reinforce the lack
of support for the regime. Eventually, the American states were forced to change the
shape of the regime.

'"

Unlike the Articles, tbe EU experienced nearly immediate support for the regime
while support for the political community emerged over time. Support for the regime
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enables a government to function on a basic level because the institutions are receiving
the input needed to produce the output demanded by the members. As support for the
political community grows, members are increasingly willing to act within the framework
of the system. Easton seems to disregard the possibility that a political community can
develop incrementally over time as long as the regime is adequately processing the
demand inputs. Given that the European sense of political community did, in fact,
gradually coalesce after the introduction of the regime, the experience of the ED
contradicts this portion of Easton's analysis. The Eastonian framework might be
amended to reflect the possibility that support for the pohtical community can grow over
time even if it does not exist when a system of government is created, as long as the
demands placed on the regime are being met.

The post-World War II trend of creating international governing bodies (the
United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc.) increases the possibility that
nations may join together for their mutual interest under a con federal government. This
thesis has explored the institutional features necessary for a confederacy to succeed in
achieving the objectives for which it was founded. The lessons are universal in
application, including the notion that there must be support for the regime at the outset of
the confederacy. Furthermore, without the proper institutional characteristics a
confederacy becomes a meaningless political system, unable to wield influence over the
member states. In the futUre, leaders should look to the institutional failures of the
~

Articles of Confederation and the successes of the European Union as they begin the

----------------------------~

------------
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difficult and daunting process of forging a new government out of existing and distinct
political systems.
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Appendix A
Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAP
CFSP
EC

ECl
ECSC
EEC

EMU
EP
EPC
EU
IGC
JHA
OEEC
SEA
TEU

Common Agricultural Policy
Cornman Foreign and Security Policy
European Community
European Court of Justice
European Coal and Steel Community
European Economic Community
European Monetary Union
European Parliament
European Political Cooperation
European Union
Intergovernmental Conference
Justice and Home Affairs
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
Single European Act
Treaty on European Union
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